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ARTICLE
THE STUDY OF MERCY:
WHAT POLITICAL SCIENTISTS KNOW




The pages of journals associated with the profession of political sci-
ence (or at least the most prestigious among them) are a far cry from the
pages of The New York Times, The Washington Post, or The Wall Street
Journal. Nor do they look much like the pages of leading magazines of
opinion, such as National Review or The New Republic. An informed reader
would generally not hunt down the November 2001 issue of the American
Political Science Review in order to read what political scientists had to say
about the terrorist attacks of September 11. Likewise, one would never
guess that Gerald Ford had pardoned Richard Nixon by reading the Novem-
ber 1974 issue of The Journal of Politics. To this day, no major journal in
political science has said a word about Bill Clinton’s pardon of fugitive
millionaire Marc Rich.
The leading journals of the discipline feature a somewhat homogenous
fare: multi-authored, highly sophisticated statistical analyses of aggregate
data, usually aimed at supporting or contradicting some major premise in a
huge body of literature, or professing to have found a different way to look
at (or solve) an old theoretical, conceptual, or methodological problem. Oc-
casionally, these exercises are adorned with debates about purely method-
ological matters or interrupted by exotic exercises in “formal theory,” or
someone’s fresh, new outlook on Thomas Hobbes or Machiavelli.
Political scientists who have taken their research and writing skills to
the study of state and federal clemency have often observed that the pardon
* Professor of Political Science, Rock Valley College, Rockford, IL. Editor, Pardon Power
Blog. Special thanks to George P. Lardner, Jr., Louis Fisher, Professors John Dinan and Mark
Rozell, the Honorable Richard A. Posner, William M. Landes, and researchers at the University of
Chicago. Any errors of fact or interpretation herein are my own.
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power has received little scholarly attention (in both relative and absolute
terms). This article shows, however, that political scientists have given the
pardon power a fair amount of attention, certainly as much as many more
“mainstream” topics of research in the discipline. The perception of scarcity
emanates from the form and, to some extent, the quality of what has been
written. For all of our analysis and commentary, the lines of communication
between past and present writers have not been clear, and the amount of
systematic, cumulative knowledge that has been generated is surprisingly
small.
In the pages that follow, I provide a brief discussion of the historical
development of political science and the sub-field known as “presidential
studies.” This discussion offers readers the context necessary to understand
both the manner in which political scientists have examined the pardon
power and the place that this literature has in the discipline overall.
I then review the literature as it has developed in what I see as four
distinct time periods. In each instance, I do my best to inform readers of the
most distinct characteristics of each piece and share what I expect each
author would consider the most important observations and conclusions.
For the most part, the review is chronological. This approach further em-
phasizes the importance of contextual developments in the discipline of po-
litical science.
After summarizing what political scientists know (and don’t know)
about clemency, I conclude with a normative assessment of the literature
and the exercise of clemency at the state and federal level. In doing so, I
believe I provide readers with significant insight as to what they can expect
the future work of political scientists will entail.
I. THE DISCIPLINE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES
While Western political philosophy traces its roots to the idealism of
Socrates and Plato, the descriptive and essentially more empirical slant of
Aristotle’s work often earns him the title of “first political scientist.”1 Simi-
larly, the value-free pragmatism of Machiavelli prompts many to label him
as “the first political scientist,” or, at least, the founder of “modern political
science”2 (the self-proclamations of Thomas Hobbes notwithstanding).3
1. ANDREW HACKER, POLITICAL THEORY: PHILOSOPHY, IDEOLOGY, SCIENCE 71 (1961); John
C. Wahlke, Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 9, 27 n.7 (1979); but
see IRWIN L. MORRIS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 45 (2010) (argu-
ing that although it is possible to assert that Aristotle was the first political scientist, no commu-
nity of true political scientists existed until the late seventeenth century).
2. GEORGE CATLIN, THE STORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 195 (1939); STEPHEN L.
WASBY, POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE DISCIPLINE AND ITS DIMENSIONS, AN INTRODUCTION 204 (1970).
3. Hobbes’ Leviathan is especially critical of Aristotle, and “other heathen philosophers,”
who defined “good and evil” on the basis of their own “appetite” and based their moral philoso-
phy on their own “passions.” Hobbes asked rhetorically, “What science is there at this day ac-
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Fortunately, the lineage of what is known in the academy as the disci-
pline of political science is more certain. The discipline first emerged in the
1880s and ‘90s when the German model of research-centered education was
copied by American universities.4 John W. Burgess, a Civil War veteran
who studied in Go¨ttingen, Leipzig and Berlin, eventually incorporated this
model at Columbia University.5 In addition to creating the nation’s “first
school of political science,” Burgess founded the discipline’s first journal,
Political Science Quarterly, in 1886.6 Burgess believed there were “funda-
mental laws governing the growth and behavior of political institutions[,]
and . . . meticulous comparative historical analysis would reveal what they
were.”7
The discipline’s character became even more distinct with the emer-
gence of the approach championed by Charles E. Merriam in the 1920s.
Merriam, who studied at Columbia before attending the University of Ber-
lin, was the first political scientist hired at the University of Chicago. His
vision of the discipline emphasized data collection and statistical analysis,
with less emphasis on theoretical (or more qualitative) approaches and
greater interest in cross-pollination with other disciplines (psychology in
particular).8
Merriam’s crusade for quantitative analysis may have been a “short-
term failure,” but “the battle he lost in the 1920s was won by his students
after World War II.”9 Eventually, the movement in Merriam’s direction
would be labeled as “behavioralism”10 and its triumph is well reflected in
the pages of the “top” journals of the discipline today.11 To be sure, purely
historical or legal analyses, normative analyses, descriptive studies, and
case studies still have their place. That place, however, is simply not in the
“best,” most prestigious journals of the discipline.
On the other hand, the quantitative revolution did not spread evenly
across sub-fields in the discipline, much less across every specific area of
study within those sub-fields. While “congressional studies” developed im-
quired by their readings and disputings?” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 686, 697 (Penguin Books
1986) (1651).
4. See Donald M. Freeman, The Making of a Discipline, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: LOOKING TO
THE FUTURE, VOLUME ONE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 17 (William
Crotty ed., 1991).
5. ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM
BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM 16–17 (1967).
6. Id. at 36; WASBY, supra note 2, at 205.
7. SOMIT & TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at 28.
8. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 21.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Id. at 25–26.
11. The American Political Science Review (American Political Science Association)
founded in 1906, the Journal of Politics (Southern Political Science Association) founded in 1939,
and the Midwest Journal of Political Science (Midwest Political Science Association, later
renamed the American Journal of Political Science) founded in 1957.
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pressive empirical analyses of congressional decision making (voting) and
elections, and the field known as “judicial politics” showcased sophisticated
mathematical approaches to judicial decision making, “presidential studies”
seemed, more often than not, resistant to quantification and stuck in the
past. To no small degree, this was attributable to hurdles peculiar to the
institution of the presidency.12
In the late 1970s, Hugh Heclo observed that “scholars gave only pass-
ing attention to the presidency” during the nineteenth century.13 Things be-
gan to change at the turn of the century, and then “more quickly after 1930,
[when presidential studies] emerged as a specialized area for research and
interpretation.”14 In his discussion of “deficiencies and correctives” in the
literature, Heclo wrote:
[C]onsidering the amount of such writing in relation to the base of
original empirical research behind it, the field is as shallow as it is
luxuriant. To a great extent, presidential studies have coasted on
the reputations of a few rightfully respected classics [and] on sec-
ondary literature and anecdotes produced by former
participants.15
By the 1980s, scholars were less kind, declaring outright that presiden-
tial research had “too often fail[ed] to meet the standards of contemporary
political science.”16 George C. Edwards III described “progress in under-
standing the presidency [as] very slow” and suggested one of the “most
striking” things about presidential research was the “low regard with which
it ha[d] been held by the discipline.”17 Furthermore, he argued readers
should be “skeptical of conclusions reached” by more “traditional methods”
of scholars who simply “explain” and “describe.”18 He encouraged political
scientists to
move beyond the description of the institution and its occupants
and attempt to explain the behavior we observe. In addition, we
must seek to reach generalizations rather than being satisfied with
discrete, ad hoc analyses. To explain we must examine relation-
ships, and to generalize we must look at these relationships under
12. For example, the “Small N” problem—on any given day, there is only one president (as
opposed to 535 members of Congress and almost 800 federal judges); presidencies (44 in total)
are spread over a considerable period of time; the presidency has undergone considerable change
since 1789, much more so than the legislative branch or the judiciary.
13. HUGH HECLO, STUDYING THE PRESIDENCY: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 8
(1977).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 30.
16. George C. Edwards III, The Quantitative Study of the Presidency, 11 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 146 (1981).
17. George C. Edwards III, Quantitative Analysis, in STUDYING THE PRESIDENCY 99 (George
C. Edwards III & Stephen J. Wayne eds., 1983).
18. Id. at 101.
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many circumstances. Quantitative analysis can be an extremely
useful tool in these endeavors.19
In the introduction to The Elusive Executive,20 Gary King and Lyn
Ragsdale continued to insist that presidential “scholars must move from
anecdotal observation to systematic description.”21 In their minds, presiden-
tial literature featured too much “reminiscences” and too little “data system-
atically acquired and analyzed.”22
In the section to follow, I review the literature of political science as it
relates to the pardon power. More specifically, I review the qualitative and
quantitative research generated by political scientists in professional jour-
nals, books, and monographs. In addition, I discuss research and commen-
tary by non-political scientists published in journals of the discipline.23
II. A REVIEW OF CLEMENCY LITERATURE
A. The Literature: Pre-1941
Perhaps fittingly, this review begins with the work of the individual
who was the first official “political scientist” in the United States, an indi-
vidual who also happened to have been imprisoned twice and was the recip-
ient of a pardon (albeit from the King of Prussia): Francis Lieber.24 In 1853,
Lieber’s On Civil Liberty and Self-Government appeared, featuring a “paper
on the abuse of the pardoning power” as a second appendix.25
Lieber’s paper first asserted clemency was a “virtue [that belonged] to
the legislator, and not to the executor of the laws[,] a virtue which ought to
shine in the code, and not in private judgment.”26 It is thus the legislator
who should be “tender, indulgent, and humane.”27 On the other hand, the
“strict and formal application of the law [can operate] against essential jus-
19. Id.
20. GARY KING & LYN RAGSDALE, THE ELUSIVE EXECUTIVE (1988).
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id.
23. I also decided to omit studies of multivariate models of public opinion or voting where
Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon was inserted as one of many independent variables. See
MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1981); Eric M. Uslaner &
M. Margaret Conway, The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and
Vote Choice in 1974, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 788 (1985).
24. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A DICTIONARY 236 (Glen H. Utter & Charles Lockhart
eds., 2002). See also Charles R. Mack, Francis Lieber and the Arts, in FRANCIS LIEBER AND THE
CULTURE OF THE MIND 143 (Charles R. Mack & Henry H. Lesesne eds., 2005) (noting that Lieber
was pardoned by the King of Prussia).
25. FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 144 (1853).
26. Id. at 148 (quoting CESARE BONESANA BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTS (1807) (Tr. from Italian)).
27. Id.
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tice.”28 There was therefore need for a “conciliatory power to protect our-
selves against [the] tyranny of the law.”29
After enumerating nine “disastrous consequences” of “arbitrary use of
the pardoning power,”30 Lieber aimed to convince readers that those conse-
quences had “shown themselves” to “an alarming degree” in the United
States and, “in many parts of the country,” were “on the increase.”31 The
“proof of this evil state of things” could be found in legislative committee
hearings, the newspapers, “recent occurrences in [a] prominent state,” sta-
tistics (such as they existed), grand jury proceedings, and official reports
and documents.32
Unfortunately, the hailstorm of evidence began with the announcement
of the “appalling fact” that a governor of a “large state” had been “openly
and widely accused of having taken money for . . . pardons” (a “fact”
which, Lieber confessed, could not actually be verified).33 This less-than-
spectacular beginning was followed with a presentation of aggregate statis-
tics from the State of Massachusetts across four decades. The data indicated
460 prisoners (out of almost four thousand) were pardoned before their term
of imprisonment had expired and had served, on average, 65% of their orig-
inal sentence.34 In a smaller span of time, Lieber found those originally
sentenced to life in prison served, on average, a little over seven years.35
Armed with aggregate data (and similar data from eleven additional states
and four federal prisons), and the unstated premise that the figures were
clearly unacceptable and/or without justification, Lieber felt confident to
report that there was plenty of “abuse” of the pardoning power.36
The paper, however, assured readers that the “object” was “not to pro-
pose any political measure” to remedy these abuses.37 No, the subject
would be treated in a “scientific” manner “irrespective of what [could] or
[might] be done.”38 That being said, Lieber held that the pardon power
“ought to exist,”39 but admitted that he was averse to transferring the power
to the legislature, the judiciary, or any other “political body” that existed for
“other purposes.”40
Instead, he believed careful investigations, resistance to importunity,
and public confidence could be obtained by the creation of a “Board of
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 150–52.
31. LIEBER, supra note 25, at 153.
32. Id. at 152–53.
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id. at 155.
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id. at 158.
37. LIEBER, supra note 25, at 158.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 161 n.15.
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Pardon,” with members (some of whom would be judges) appointed by the
legislature.41 Lieber also suggested that pardons should only be issued by
the governor when they are recommended by the board,42 and that the de-
sire to grant clemency be advertised with the reasons for clemency pub-
lished as well.43 If such boards were established, “a series of fair principles
and rules” would, “in a short time,” be “settled by practice, and the pardon
[power] would be far less exposed to arbitrary action.”44
Fourteen years later, Francis Lieber was no less enthusiastic about the
topic. When he wrote on proposed amendments to the New York constitu-
tion, the first order of business was pardons (followed by discussion of such
minor concerns as judicial independence, suffrage, representation in Con-
gress, federalism, municipal government, and education).45 Without delay,
Lieber informed his readers there was “no inherent reason why the pardon-
ing power should belong to the executive”46 and that there were “many and
urgent reasons why it should either be taken from the executive, or at least
should be greatly modified.”47 The power was “inconsistent” with policy
and the administration of justice, encouraged crime, effaced “the moral
character of the community,” and was “illogical and mischievous.”48
He then argued that there was “[n]o better way of moderating the par-
doning power” than by establishing a board of pardon, to work “in conjunc-
tion with the executive power.”49 Lieber’s view of such boards had changed
little over the years, though he added a requirement of senatorial confirma-
tion and an insistence on lengthy terms.50
In 1910, James D. Barnett, Professor of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of Oregon published “The Grounds of Pardons in the Courts” in the
Yale Law Journal.51 Barnett observed that while the “motives” and “discre-
tion” behind the pardon power were “not subject to judicial inquiry,” courts
had nevertheless “often” taken the time to “discuss the grounds upon which
pardons [had been] based.”52 There followed six-and-a-half pages of com-
mentary composed of quotations from decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
41. Id. at 164.
42. Id. at 165. Lieber also suggested that governors be forced to grant clemency if a board
recommends such a second time.
43. LIEBER, supra note 25, at 165.
44. Id. at 166.
45. FRANCIS LIEBER, Reflections on the Changes Which May Seem Necessary in the Present
Constitution of the State of New York, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER,
VOLUME TWO: CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 181, 185 (1883).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 186.
48. Id. at 187.
49. Id. at 189.
50. Id.
51. James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardons in the Courts, 20 YALE L.J. 131 (1910).
52. Id. at 131.
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a variety of lower federal courts, state courts, and an opinion of the U.S.
Attorney General.
After describing a pardon as “an act of grace” and a “work of
mercy,”53 Barnett catalogued judicial notice of pardons on the basis of ac-
tual innocence, justifiable homicide, as a reward for accomplices who
turned State’s evidence, or a means of generally resolving some deficiency
in criminal law.54 Barnett also noted justifications for pardons related to the
“merit” of the individual recipients (such as “reformation” and “expiation
of the offense”), grounds which he considered “absolutely incompatible
with the strict doctrine of grace.”55
Progressive politics were responsible for the appearance of no less
than four articles related to clemency in the Annals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science (henceforth “The Annals”) in 1913 and
1914. Theodore Roosevelt argued the “new penology” was based on “jus-
tice to both the prisoner and to society” and that the pardon power was “one
of the most objectionable points” in our criminal justice system.56 He sup-
ported the point by reference to a New York Times’ article in which a major-
ity of twenty governors complained about having precious little time for
clemency decision making and “advocated” the creation of a “board of par-
dons” in their respective states.57 Roosevelt agreed, so long as governors
served as members of such boards and the remaining members were ap-
pointed, “non-political” persons of “high integrity and sound judgment,”
equipped with their own “secretary and office staff.”58
Herbert S. Hadley, the Governor of Missouri, followed Roosevelt’s
commentary with his own argument that chief executives “be relieved from
the burden and responsibility of dealing with” pardon applications.59 Had-
ley complained:
[Governors are] peculiarly subject to and liable to unwarranted
and malicious attacks by sensational and unscrupulous newspa-
pers for granting executive clemency to those convicted of crime.
And it is easy, by a failure to publish the facts upon which clem-
ency in each case was based, to mislead and to prejudice the pub-
lic mind against a proper policy of executive clemency.60
53. Id.
54. Id. at 133–34.
55. Id. at 135.
56. Theodore Roosevelt, The New Penology, 46 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 4, 4
(1913).
57. See Governors Discuss the Granting of Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1913, at SM11
(detailing numerous interviews with various governors in regards to the pardoning power).
58. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 4–5.
59. Herbert S. Hadley, New Theory as to Punishment of Crime, 46 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 40, 43 (1913).
60. Id.
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On the other hand, if pardons were administered by a board of pardons
and paroles, decisions “would assume something of the form of a judgment
of a court” and “better and more complete investigation[s]” would be possi-
ble.61 Hadley guessed such boards would largely be insulated from “unwar-
ranted attacks and misrepresentations.”62
By 1914, William W. Smithers, of the Philadelphia Bar, asserted it was
“generally conceded” that “some advisory board should hear applications
and make recommendations” to the governor for the sake of “regularity,
publicity and careful consideration.”63 Smithers also agreed with Hadley’s
notion that the pardon power “invite[d] or at least afford[ed] ready opportu-
nity for the most unreasonable invective, calumny and innuendo.”64 How-
ever, Smithers blamed this circumstance on the broad scope of the power,
“the impossibility of review and, especially . . . the superficial knowledge
of the subject among laymen and the meager special study given it by even
the bench and the bar.”65
Even more than Roosevelt and Hadley, Smithers defended the pardon
power and highlighted its importance in the attempt to “emerge from the
cloud of antiquity” in order to discard everything about the criminal justice
system that was “old, cruel, useless and futile.”66 He noted that while the
administration of clemency could never be perfect, it was “significant that it
ha[d] never been overlooked in any scheme of government since the dawn
of history.”67 The executive’s “oath to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully
executed’ include[d] the declaration that he will maintain the constitution
which confers upon him the pardoning power,”68 and under state and fed-
eral constitutions in America, it was the “moral duty” of executives to “af-
ford relief if a rational interpretation of all the data mark[ed] the case as
entitled to remedy by the higher justice.”69 Smithers argued that withhold-
ing a pardon in a “proper case” would be no more acceptable than refusing
to “call out the militia when the preservation of public peace demands it.”70
Smithers insisted “[t]here [had been] a general acceptance of the theo-
ries of criminology and penology which [had] evolved . . . and proven . . .
consistent with the moral and intellectual advancement manifested in all
other phases of community life.”71 As a result, the “fallacy of the traditional
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. William W. Smithers, The Use of the Pardoning Power, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 61, 63 (1914).
64. Id. at 61.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 61–62.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Smithers, supra note 63, at 62.
70. Id. at 62–63.
71. Id. at 64.
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vindictive punishment of criminals” was recognized, as well as the “futile”
nature of attempts to “diminish crime by statutes fixing a definite penalty
for a specified offense.”72 Smithers encouraged executives not to “shrink
from exercising the pardon power.”73 Indeed, he wrote, if there is any
“abuse” at all it was in the “failure of executives to act,” because prisons
were packed with individuals incarcerated “years ago” under a system of
“rigid impersonal and mechanical criminal laws” and “many inmates . . .
could and ought to be free.”74 He argued that executives should do more
than respond more agreeably to clemency applications.75 Smithers empha-
sized that they were not “bound to wait until an application for pardon” was
filed.76 The governor had a “constitutional duty . . . to exercise his power
rationally in all exceptional cases.”77
Samuel Scoville, Jr.’s blistering 1914 commentary, “The Evolution of
Our Criminal Procedure,”78 suggested the acceptance of the Progressive
view of pardons was far from universal. From Scoville’s standpoint, the
Progressive view amounted to mere dust raised on the path through an “age
of unreason,” a passing “nonsense age,” on the way to the dawn of “com-
mon sense.”79
By Scoville’s telling, “[o]ur forebears were grim and hasty folk” with
an “exaggerated regard for property and a contempt for human life.”80 As a
result, both criminal law and procedure were “harsh” and punishments were
“bloody” and “barbarous.”81 Then at some point, judges “began to insist
upon the observance of every technicality,” which had the effect of making
convictions very difficult to obtain.82 Scoville then provided (and
bemoaned) a list of judicially imposed changes (and associated horror sto-
ries) that, in his view, made any conviction a “wonder.”83 Precedents and
principles were given “the force of actual statutes.”84 Direct evidence was
preferred over circumstantial evidence.85 The burden was placed on the
prosecution to prove “entirely every detail of its case.”86 Criminal defend-
ants were presumed innocent.87 Convicted criminals were “practically”
72. Id.
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id.
75. Smithers, supra note 63, at 65.
76. Id. at 62.
77. Id.
78. Samuel Scoville, Jr., The Evolution of Our Criminal Procedure, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 93 (1914).
79. Id. at 93, 98–99.
80. Id. at 93.
81. Id. at 93–94.
82. Id. at 94.
83. Id. at 94, 97.
84. Scoville, supra note 78, at 94.
85. Id. at 95.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 95.
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given “an unlimited right of appeal.”88 Worst of all, “technicalities which
were devised to save innocent men” were used “only to shield guilty
ones.”89
Outside of the courtroom, exhibit one in Scoville’s nightmare was gu-
bernatorial abuse of the pardon power.90 He noted that in Pennsylvania,
“practically no prisoners” served out their sentence because they were “al-
ways pardoned or paroled.”91 In South Carolina, the governor had pardoned
721 convicts (100 just before Thanksgiving).92 In Tennessee, 956 criminals
had been pardoned “and 152 of them were murderers.”93 The prime exam-
ple, in a style that might impress even Michael Dukakis, read:
Eight years ago in one of our central cities, a man committed
murder and was sentenced to be hung. Such a flood of sentimen-
tal appeals poured down upon the governor that his sentence was
commuted. Six years later he was pardoned. Six months after his
pardon, this criminal murdered a man who had befriended him,
his friend’s wife and three children in order that he might rob his
house of $200.94
  Scoville was, however, comforted that a court of appeals in Oklahoma
had refused to set aside an indictment so “the guilty [could] be convicted
and taught that it [was] exceedingly serious and dangerous to violate the
laws.”95 He was also pleased that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused
to let a criminal defendant “juggle” with his “constitutional rights.”96 Even
better, a judge in New York “took charge” of a trial, chose a jury quickly,
and refused to allow “delays, evasions and petty technicalities.”97 The U.S.
Supreme Court had also ruled that reversals on the basis of technical error
would only be granted when errors are serious enough to have affected the
merits of the case,98 a position that had been supported by the American
Bar Association for six years.99
88. Id. at 98.
89. Id. at 96. (Scoville’s list of “technicality” horror stories was impressive. Among other
things, he noted convictions overturned because the name of a county was omitted from an indict-
ment, the name of a county was mentioned then referred to as “said county,” the letter “l” was
omitted from the word “malice,” the letter “a” was omitted from the word “breast,” an indictment
abbreviated “West” in West Virginia, the word “the” was omitted in another indictment and a last
name was misspelled).
90. See Scoville, supra note 78, at 98 (lamenting the liberal use of pardoning power).
91. Id. at 98.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 99.
95. Id.
96. Scoville, supra note 78, at 99.
97. Id. at 100.
98. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 245 (1910) (dismissing minor, technical errors
that had no bearing on the outcome of the case).
99. Scoville, supra note 78, at 100.
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President Warren Harding, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover,
and William Howard Taft (Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and
former president) all attended the semi-annual meeting of the Academy of
Political Science at the Hotel Astor in May 1921. There they heard Freder-
ick A. Cleveland’s paper on the “reorganization” of the federal govern-
ment.100 Along the way, Cleveland “questioned whether the ‘pardons’
process should be [housed] in the ‘prosecuting’ department.”101 In his mind,
prosecution should be “kept out,” or placed “very far in the background,”
when it came to assessing pardon applications.102 Instead, this “public func-
tion” should be “transferred” to some “group” that had, as a primary pur-
pose, an “outworking of the problem of social reconstruction.”103 Taft
referred to Cleveland’s presentation as “interesting.”104
The following year, Christen Jensen published The Pardoning Power
in the American States.105 His approach to the topic was very different from
that of the authors discussed to this point, but not simply because the format
was that of a book. Jensen had decided to take a brief break from his teach-
ing duties at Brigham Young University in order to complete a doctoral
dissertation at the University of Chicago. His work reflected Chicago’s em-
phasis on original research and cross-pollination of disciplines.
The end-product was clearly less normative and prescriptive, and more
descriptive and analytic, than the literature discussed thus far.106 Instead of
focusing on what states should (or should not) do, Jensen made it his pri-
mary task to simply describe, as exhaustively and accurately as possible,
what each and every state (and former colony) had done and was doing.107
In chapter I,108 he employed historical and legal analysis in a discussion of
the pardon power in the American colonies. In chapter VII,109 he discussed
controversial matters related to the effect of pardons, the scope of the par-
don power, the timing and validity of pardons, and complications that sur-
100. Frederick A. Cleveland, The Reorganization of the Federal Government: An Alternative
Proposal, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, July 1921, at 31,
31.
101. Id. at 40.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 40; see id. at 45 (more specifically, Cleveland suggested the creation of a Bureau of
Parole, Probation and Pardons that would be housed under the Assistant Secretary for Public
Welfare).
104. William Howard Taft, Financial Retrenchment and Governmental Reorganization, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, July 1921, at 90, 90.
105. CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1922).
106. See generally id. (providing a historical perspective on the pardoning power in the
states).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1–8 (discussing pardoning powers in chapter I: Introductory: The Pardoning Power
in the American Colonies).
109. Id. at 110–30 (reviewing controversial matters of pardons in chapter VII: Some Legal
Aspects of the Pardon Power).
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rounded conditions attached to pardons. Among those credited with having
assisted Jensen was Charles E. Merriam.110
On pages 11 to 15, Jensen outlined the manner in which the organiza-
tion of the pardon power had developed in each state via constitutional and,
in many instances, statutory change. The result was the discovery of no less
than twelve “forms” for administering the pardon power.111 This remarka-
ble degree of diversity hardly faded, even when Jensen focused on a topic
as narrow and specific as administering boards.112 In some states, such
boards handled issues related to pardon and parole.113 Most states found it
prudent to require the presence of the attorney general on the board,114
while others required the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
state auditor, chief justice of the state’s supreme court, commissioner of
agriculture, or some combination of those officers.115
With respect to limitations on pardon authorities, Jensen found much
less diversity. While some state constitutions spelled out regulations, the
more common method of regulating the pardon power was through statu-
tory legislation, which allowed pardon authorities to “formulate and adopt
rules and regulations.”116 Some states did not allow pardon before convic-
tion.117 Some did not allow pardon in cases of treason, or impeachment,118
or both.119 With respect to rules and procedures of pardon authorities (espe-
cially those related to the time, place, and public notice of hearings), Jensen
found “no uniformity.”120 Indeed, his very brief summarizations of state
notice of hearing requirements took up the better part of five pages.121
Criticisms of the pardon power are spread throughout Jensen’s book
but, collected together, amounted to not much more than two (of more than
140) pages. Additionally, one would be hard pressed to get a sense of which
criticisms or calls for reform Jensen considered more noteworthy or legiti-
mate than the others. The style was clearly that of a social scientist attempt-
110. Id. at v.
111. JENSEN, supra note 105, at 15–16 (various options for administering the pardon power
include: (1) the governor alone, (2) the governor and senate, (3) the governor and executive coun-
cil, (4) advisory board to the governor and executive council, (5) governor and advisory pardon
board, (6) governor and temporary advisory board, (7) governor and board of pardons, (8) a board
with gubernatorial consent, (9) a board ruling via majority vote, (10) a board via unanimous vote,
(11) the governor and a pardon attorney, and (12) two pardon authorities with divided
responsibility).
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at 16–17. Jensen summarized the personnel of state boards at 19–21.
116. Id. at 29–30.
117. JENSEN, supra note 105, at 30–31.
118. Id. at 32. (Sixteen states).
119. Id. (Twenty-seven states).
120. Id. at 33–34.
121. Id. at 38–42.
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ing to maintain objectivity while systematically presenting vast amounts of
information.
If Charles Merriam had had his way, every article on state and federal
pardons from that point forward would have had the style and quality of his
student, Christen Jensen. The literature of pardons, however, like the field
of presidential studies in general, resisted the tendency toward empirical
analysis.
Harold W. Stoke’s 1927 “A Review of the Pardoning Power”122 was
clearly influenced by Jensen’s style, but the quality of the analysis was an-
other issue. Stoke penned a “hasty,” one-and-a-half page “sketch” of the
development of the pardon power and noted there was “wide diversity
among the states” in the methods provided for “administering [that]
power.”123 Stoke made the point by presenting fifteen seemingly random,
un-sourced, points of state pardon trivia: thirty-seven states required the
consent of the governor; in six states the governor was a member of a board
which voted on pardons; in Rhode Island, the governor had to obtain the
consent of the Senate; in Maine, an executive council and an advisory board
had to provide consent, etc.124
Stoke then raised a more serious concern: the “alarm manifest in the
press and on the public platform” regarding America’s crime wave and the
“uneasy feeling” of the “general public” that condemned criminals were
released too “soon,” “[reappearing] to prey upon an indulgent society.”125
More specifically, Stoke asked, if pardons were “on the increase,” had
“clemency been granted too freely and [had] governors been too leni-
ent?”126 Stoke claimed he had investigated the matter and discovered the
answer in “cold figures” gathered from “a few representative states.”127
In fact, Stoke discussed pardon activity in only six states (IL, IN, KY,
OH, MO, and TN).128 In some instances, he provided figures on pardons by
administration (OH, MO), without specifying the length of time covered.129
In other instances, he provided data from a single year (KY), a two-year
period (IL), a period of ten years (IN) or no specified period at all (TN).130
Regardless, Stoke asserted his “facts” showed pardons were “becoming
rarer.”131 As a result,
122. Harold W. Stoke, Review of the Pardoning Power, 16 KY. L.J. 34, 34 (1927).
123. Id. at 34–35.
124. Id. at 35–36. An examination of Stoke’s figures suggests he was not relying on Jensen’s
work.
125. Id. at 36–37.
126. Id. at 37.
127. Id.
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[t]he person who carries to a study of this sort the preconceived
notion that he will be able to blame the presence of criminals in
society upon wholesale release by our Governors will be disap-
pointed by the virtue and restraint exhibited by our Chief execu-
tives. . . . [S]anity and conscience have characterized the use of
this power in nearly all cases . . . the use of the pardoning power
has been cautious and conservative.132
Therefore, Stoke asked, “who or what” was “responsible” for his gen-
eration’s “deluge of lawlessness?”133 Once again, he claimed, “the facts
[spoke] for themselves” in anecdotal evidence.134 In Kentucky, a prisoner
sentenced to life in prison was actually eligible for parole at the end of eight
years.135 In New York, eligibility was achieved in ten.136 In Illinois, only
six years of imprisonment were required.137 As a result, while governors
had granted very few pardons in six states (Stoke inexplicably removed the
State of Tennessee from the representative anecdotal pool in this part of the
“investigation” and replaced it with the State of New York), the parole sys-
tem had “silently, continuously . . . poured its masses of criminals upon us
to murder and pillage.”138 Parole was, thus, the “leak through which the
dregs of a prison population [were] filtering back into society.”139 The pa-
role system made pardons “unnecessary by accomplishing the same results
without the attendant publicity and responsibility.”140
Although it constitutes a slight deviation from the general chronology
of this discussion, it seems appropriate here to compare Stoke’s discussion
with that of Clair Wilcox, who appeared in The Annals in 1931.141 Wilcox
calmly observed that the “doors” out of prison were “many” and, in a “ma-
jority of cases,” sentences were “reduced from the full term.”142 In 1927, no
less than 44,000 prisoners were “released” from state and federal prisons
and reformatories.143 Forty-nine percent were paroled.144 Forty-two percent
132. Id. at 37–38. Stoke granted there were some “notable exceptions” to his analysis, such as
Governor Walton in Oklahoma and Miriam A. Ferguson, former governor of Texas who granted
clemency more than three thousand times in only two years in office. Stoke also mentioned “dis-
content” and “dissatisfaction” in Michigan and in Colorado.
133. Id. at 38.




138. Id. at 40.
139. Id. Stoke justified this language somewhat with the unreferenced claim that “almost uni-
formly twenty percent of those released on parole violate[d] them within the year or half-year
period” and a statement by the chairman of the Illinois Board of Paroles that “as high as forty
percent of those released on parole [were] known to violate them.” Id.
140. Stoke, supra note 122, at 42.
141. Clair Wilcox, The Open Door, 157 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 102
(1931).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 103–04.
144. Id. at 104.
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were released because their sentences had expired.145 Six percent were re-
leased after payment of a fine, in order to be deported, or to be delivered to
some other institution.146 A mere three percent were pardoned.147
Without a similar presentation of data, Wilcox asserted the pardon
power was “subject to serious abuse” and had “frequently been abused by
governors who have yielded to political pressure.”148 He added that the par-
don power placed an “unfairly heavy burden” on governors who did not
“have the time” to “properly” consider applications—which is why some
states had created agencies and boards to advise and assist with the pro-
cess.149 Wilcox insisted the clemency power was necessary, but believed
“with the continuous development of adequate systems of parole, there
should be diminishing number of occasions for its use.”150
Arguably, Wilcox was just as critical of parole as Stoke,151 but Wil-
cox’s criticisms were provided more as a list of points of reform as opposed
to grist for the horror story mill. When all was said and done he saw the
need for the establishment of “effective machinery for parole administra-
tion” and held that there was “firm ground for the belief that parole [would]
become an increasingly effective instrument of penal treatment.”152
Edward G. Griffin’s 1928 appearance in The Annals introduced an-
other approach to the topic of pardons which would become quite popular:
the case study approach.153 While it is difficult to know from reading Grif-
fin’s piece whether the ideals of the Progressives or the law-and-order ap-
proach of Scoville had won the battle, he did note the pardon power of








151. Among other things, Wilcox wrote:
In general, parole selection is still an unscientific, rule-of-thumb procedure . . . .
Methods of supervision are similarly inadequate . . . . Printed rules are announced but
are not enforced. Written reports are required but there is nobody to check on the accu-
racy of the replies . . . . Other states have pressed sheriffs, constables, detectives, and
police officers into service. These men are generally not qualified to advise and assist
the prisoner in regaining his place in society, and, since unpaid, are inclined to neglect
the work . . . . Little if any training is provided or required. The parole officers are
almost always underpaid and overloaded with work.
Id. at 108–09.
152. Id. at 112.
153. Edward G. Griffin, Executive Clemency, 136 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 142,
142 (1928). In the case study approach, the researcher purposely focuses on a small number of
examples (cases) and attempts to gain expertise with respect to each of them. The hope is that, by
digging deeply into each example, the researcher will gain insights into larger processes and, as a
result, be able to generalize outward.
154. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-MAY-13 13:56
2012] THE STUDY OF MERCY 799
Indeed, Griffin, counsel to the governor of New York, was prompted
to write his piece in response to a report issued by the Baumes Committee
in New York State.155 The report complained of trends in generosity of
clemency grants in recent decades and suspected the causes were “relaxing
of rigid scrutiny” in consideration of the merits of clemency applications
and “freer rein to sentimentalism” toward the “criminal classes.”156 The
report also complained that the governor’s “leniency to criminals” had en-
couraged crime.157 But, Griffin warned that critics should have known bet-
ter than to “generalize about executive clemency, or to draw inferences
from insufficient facts as to the way it operates.”158 Griffin found such
“facts” in a statement by the governor to the New York legislature,159
which documented that a “large percentage” of pardons granted annually
had been “issued under entirely justifiable circumstances” because they
simply restored the right to vote.160 A second class of pardons, which con-
stituted a large portion of annual grants, were pardons given to former pris-
oners who were aliens seeking to complete citizenship papers and become
American citizens.161 Griffin maintained that it would have been “unreason-
able for the governor to refuse a pardon under such circumstances.”162 As a
result, typical New York pardon recipients were not being sprung from
prison. They had already served their time (if any such service was re-
quired) and taken care of associated fines and penalties. After “some time,”
in exchange for “evidence” of “earning an honest living,” their right to vote
was restored or their path to citizenship was cleared.163
With respect to commutations of sentence, Griffin was no less hesitant.
He argued there are actually “many” reasons why such grants were “neces-
sary.”164 Among the “most justifiable” were commutations recommended
by district attorneys and situations where support for clemency may have
been exchanged for “information [about others] involved in a crime.”165
Said Griffin:
It is an invariable rule not to commute the sentence unless both
the judge and the district attorney before whom the man was tried




158. Id. at 145.
159. “Statement of the Pardons Commutations and Reprieves Granted by the Governor for the
Year 1926,” State of New York Legislative Document (1927) No 73.
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upon the parties who know most about the offense, as well as
upon those who must decide the immediate request.166
Given these facts, Griffin suspected the underlying anxieties of the
Baumes Committee were actually the byproduct of ten respites (delays) that
were granted to murderers.167 The public might generally be “horrified at
any leniency” toward a person convicted of such a serious crime and might
reasonably call out for “speedy administration of justice.”168 However,
Griffin noted that “once the accused is dead there [was] no opportunity to
correct mistakes.”169 In addition, he explained that respites were only
granted “after the written request of the district attorney who tried the
case.”170 As if all of that could fail to take the wind out of the sails of the
Baumes Committee, nine of the ten persons to whom respites were granted
were “eventually” electrocuted.171 The tenth decided to provide valuable
testimony that was utilized in the prosecution of others convicted of the
same crime.172
Griffin concluded:
There are justifiable reasons for the exercise of executive clem-
ency. . . . It is equally wrong from a legal as well as a moral sense
to refuse to grant a pardon under circumstances where the facts
indicate the opposite course should be followed. A governor must
make the correct decision in each case. He should have the cour-
age to do what he thinks is right under all the facts of the case. If
he does not do so he should not be governor.173
The rebuttal to the Baumes Committee was narrow and specific, not to
mention dated, but its current relevance suggests it is not time bound. It
should also be noted that, while the piece featured no statistical analysis, or
even tables of data, the analysis is both systematic and data driven.
The so-called Ferguson Case (1917) resulted in the appearance of three
articles in two journals that are, today, considered among the most prestigi-
ous in the discipline, the American Political Science Review (hereafter the
APSR) and Political Research Quarterly (hereafter PRQ).174 The facts of
the incident were as follows: On July 23, 1917, the speaker of the Texas




170. Id. at 144.
171. Id.
172. Griffin, supra note 153, at 144.
173. Id. at 145.
174. Frank M. Stewart, Impeachment in Texas, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 652 (1930); Frank M.
Stewart, Legislative Pardon for Impeachment in Texas, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 365 (1931) [herein-
after Stewart, Legislative Pardon]; Cortez A.M. Ewing, The Impeachment of James E. Ferguson,
48 POL. SCI. Q. 184 (1933). A fourth article was written before clemency became a feature of the
Ferguson Case. James Edward, The Impeachment of Governor Ferguson, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
111 (1918).
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House of Representatives issued a call for the House to meet in special
session to consider impeachment of Governor James E. Ferguson.175 The
governor promptly labeled the call “unconstitutional.”176
Ferguson then decided to call for his own special session, and sched-
uled it to meet at the same time as the Speaker’s.177 The House met under
the Speaker’s call, investigated thirteen counts via thirty-nine witnesses and
six hundred pages of testimony.178 It recommended the impeachment of
Ferguson by a vote of 82 to 51.179 The Senate suspended Ferguson from
office, but the formal trial was postponed because the special session was
about to end.180
The newly installed governor, William P. Hobby, issued his own call
for a special session in order to “facilitate a fair and impartial trial of the
articles of impeachment” against Ferguson.181 The result was the reading of
twenty-one articles, the testimony of thirty-two witnesses, and five days of
hellfire and brimstone from the impeached governor himself (who also gave
his own closing arguments in a two-hour speech).182 The specially assem-
bled impeachment court convicted Ferguson on ten of the twenty-one arti-
cles and disqualified him from office.183 The majority report was adopted
by a vote of twenty-five to three.184
Eight years later, Miriam A. Ferguson, wife of the impeached gover-
nor, became governor and passed the Amnesty Act of 1925, aimed at absolv-
ing all persons previously impeached by the legislature.185 The impeached
husband then claimed that the amnesty terminated the Texas legislature’s
removal of his eligibility for office and took steps to have his name placed,
once again, on the Democratic ticket as candidate for governor.186 In 1930,
however, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously ruled the amnesty
unconstitutional.187
The analyses of the Ferguson Case by Frank M. Stewart188 and Cortez
A.M. Ewing189 followed the case-study approach of Griffin. Stewart’s cov-
erage of the case, in the APSR, was more general with an emphasis on legal
175. Ewing, supra note 174, at 195.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 197.
178. Id. at 198.
179. Id. at 198–99.
180. Id. at 199.
181. Ewing, supra note 174, at 199.
182. Id. at 199, 202.
183. Id. at 205.
184. Id. at 207.
185. Stewart, Legislative Pardon, supra note 174, at 365 (1931); 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 454,
455.
186. Stewart, Legislative Pardon, supra note 174, at 365 (1931).
187. Ferguson v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 526, 536 (Tex. 1930).
188. Stewart, Impeachment in Texas, supra note 174, at 652; Stewart, Legislative Pardon,
supra note 174, at 365.
189. Ewing, supra note 174, at 184.
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issues raised by the episode and resulting decisions of the courts. His 1931
discussion of Ferguson was primarily a brief, journalist-style report on the
Texas Supreme Court’s 1930 ruling. Ewing’s coverage featured analysis of
voting data in the Texas Senate, and was more historical, biographical, and
meticulous in detail.190
The last article that appeared in this time period was written by Everett
S. Brown and published in the APSR.191 Brown’s discussion—while focus-
ing on the restoration of civil and political rights by presidential pardon—
was very much in the style of the APSR pieces by Frank Stewart discussed
above. With considerable assistance from U.S. Pardon Attorney Daniel M.
Lyons, Brown informed readers that, even if the president of the United
States granted a pardon, restoring the rights of an individual, he/she might
still suffer consequences of conviction via state law.192 Our federal system
created the possible need for additional acts of clemency from individual
states.
While a piece of this style would never grace the pages of the APSR
today, Brown was very much in acceptable form by saying little or nothing
critical of the circumstance that he described. Thus, he offered no sugges-
tion for reform, or even the possibility of the need for such.
B. Willard H. Humbert’s Masterpiece
Willard Harrison Humbert earned his doctoral degree at Johns Hopkins
University. It was also the place where he was first encouraged to study
presidential pardons, and the result of his efforts was a tour de force, the
likes of which has yet to be replicated.
Humbert’s The Pardoning Power of the President (1941)193 attempted
to provide “a systematic account of the theory and the application of the
pardoning power.”194 The preface noted that, after discussion of history,
semantics, legal and procedural aspects, “facts” would be presented that
related “to the actual exercise by the President of his pardoning power.”195
The facts presented in chapter 6 (entitled “Administrative Aspects”) were
actually data meticulously gathered from a record book kept by the U.S.
Attorney General or his assistant from 1860–1884196 and data from the An-
nual Report of the Attorney General, from 1884–1936.197
190. Id. at 204.
191. Everett S. Brown, The Restoration of Civil and Political Rights by Presidential Pardon,
34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 295 (1940).
192. Id. at 295–96.
193. W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (1941).
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 95. The “record book” actually extended back to 1854, but Humbert found the first
six years of records not to be accurate.
197. Id. The data were gathered by calendar years from 1860–1884, and for fiscal years from
1885–1936.
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Humbert’s presentation hardly reached the level of mathematical so-
phistication that would be required in the top journals of political science
today. Additionally, his free-flowing style of discussion and analysis of the
seventy-six years of data would certainly be dismissed for lack of some
guiding theory. Nonetheless, Professor Humbert’s exercise in barefoot em-
piricism was a major event in the pardon literature, and it provided a wealth
of information and insight. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that The
Pardoning Power remains the standard.
It is not my purpose here to review every presentation of data by Pro-
fessor Humbert. I would, however, like to mention the presentations that
say the most about the exercise of the pardon power and those that are most
relevant to current issues.
In Table 1 of The Pardoning Power, “Applications for Clemency and
the Disposition Made of Them,”198 Humbert identified eight different forms
of clemency.199 In Figure 1 of this article, I have collapsed these categories
to present aggregate data on pardons and commutations of sentence from
Humbert’s data and more recent data from the Office of the Pardon Attor-
ney (OPA), Department of Justice, from 1937–2012.200 Data to the left of
the vertical line in Figure 1 are from Humbert, while data to the right of that
line are from the OPA.
First, it is quite obvious that commutations of sentence, a very rare
occurrence in more recent decades, were actually quite common for the
better part of five decades (1890–1940). In addition, Humbert suggested the
apparent dominance of pardons from 1860–1884 may have been the result
of “a failure to name properly in every case the form of clemency
granted.”201 That is to say, commutations of sentence were probably more
common than the left side of the chart indicates.
Humbert also identified a second point of interest in these data. He
noted that, beginning with 1895, “the President disclosed consistently and
impressively” an “inclination toward” the granting of “pardons to restore
civil rights” (the most common form of clemency today).202 In the first
three decades of Humbert’s data, less than ten percent of the annual acts of
clemency involved the mere restoration of rights.203 By 1905, the percent-
198. Id. at 96–99.
199. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 100. The eight types of clemency defined by Humbert are:
1) full pardon, 2) conditional pardon, 3) pardon to terminate sentence and restore civil rights, 4)
pardon to restore civil rights, 5) commutation, 6) conditional commutation, 7) reprieves, and re-
mission of fines, and 8) forfeitures and costs.
200. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., CLEMENCY STATISTICS, http://www.
justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
201. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 100.
202. Id. at 101.
203. Id.
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age had crossed the 50% mark.204 In 1935, 66% of annual acts were par-
dons to restore rights.205
FIGURE 1: PARDONS V. COMMUTATIONS OF SENTENCE, 1860–2012
When looking at Figure 1, it is also worth remembering that while
Humbert’s data extended to 1936, his book was published in 1941, so it is
most certain that he was aware of the nosedive in commutations of sentence
from 1937 to 1940. As a result, Humbert observed that, after the opening of
the twentieth century, presidents “largely departed from the most beneficial
forms of clemency” and gravitated to forms which did not “disturb as dras-
tically the original sentence of the courts.”206
In Chart III of his book,207 Humbert presented data on the total number
of pardon applications in comparison to grants and denials. Once again, the
data had a modern day feel to them in that a large and increasing gap ap-
pears between the total number of applications and the number of decisions
(grants or denials). Humbert observed:
If the inability of the President to consider every request for clem-
ency was not apparent in the early days of the government, it
became evident with the increase in clemency cases [from
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 102.
207. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 105.
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1910–1936] . . . . As a consequence, acts of clemency increased
in number but the growth did not keep pace with the increase of
requests for executive clemency.208
In Figure 2, I have updated Humbert’s data on clemency applications
and cases left pending.209 First, it is somewhat surprising that, while recent
years have featured record numbers of applications, the number of applica-
tions was also generally high toward the end of Humbert’s data. As a result,
the more noticeable trend is the fairly recent growth in the number of cases
left unaddressed. Once again, however, it is worth remembering that Hum-
bert went to press in 1941, so he was probably also aware of the somewhat
radical increase in pending applications to that point. The comparable cir-
cumstances at the back end of both Humbert’s data and the most recent data
from the OPA suggest Humbert’s analysis and suggestions could be rele-
vant and useful today.
FIGURE 2: APPLICATIONS FILED, APPLICATIONS PENDING: 1860–2012
Reasonably enough, Humbert guessed the increase in clemency appli-
cations was at least partially correlated with increases in the general popula-
tion and the growth of the average prison population.210 It turned out that
208. Id. at 107–09.
209. In Humbert’s data, cases were described as pending at the end of the fiscal year. In data
provided by the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA), they are described as cases pending at the
beginning of the fiscal year.
210. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 109.
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his analysis of population data211 revealed a steady increase across time,
followed by a “sharp decline . . . in the rate of expansion,” followed by “a
more rapid increase” ending in 1930.212 Data on average daily prison popu-
lation (from 1896 to 1936) were more informative.213 At the front end of
the data (1896), the figure stood at 301.214 At the back end (1936), it stood
at 14,042.215 As a result, the rate of growth in the average daily prison
population was “comparatively much more rapid” and reached “far greater
heights” than the population growth rate of the nation.216
Humbert suggested that the “enormous expansion” in the federal
prison population was “attributable to a number of factors.”217 He argued
that the “most influential factor” was
the increase in national legislation as exemplified in the expan-
sion of the criminal code. Because of the relatively simple condi-
tions of social and economic life in the early days, and because of
the absence of a paternal attitude in the national government, the
early legislative product was neither of such magnitude nor of
such nature that large numbers of people came under the influ-
ence of the national law. However, with the emergence of a more
intricate life, with correlative assumption of wider powers by the
national government, congressional legislative output during re-
cent years became large and perhaps more restrictive of the free-
dom of the individual.218
A director of the Bureau of Prisons more specifically identified the
Dyer Automobile Act, the Narcotics Act, the liquor legislation, and the
Mann White Slave Act as having “tremendously increased” federal crime
problems.219
In Humbert’s view, there were two significant questions: “Why has the
decrease in the number of acts of clemency been so marked when compared
with the growth in average daily prison population?” and “What explains
increases and decreases in grants?”220
In Figure 3, I have updated Humbert’s data on both grants and denials.
What must jump out at scholars today is the fact that it is hard to argue
there was anything like an absolute decline in clemency grants in Hum-
bert’s day. The steady decline in pardons and commutations, as well as the
211. Id. at 110–11, Table III.
212. Id. at 110.
213. Id. at 111–12, Table IV.
214. Id. at 111.
215. Id. at 112.




220. Id. at 115.
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increase in clemency denials that continues to this day, began after Hum-
bert went to press.
FIGURE 3: OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS FOR CLEMENCY: 1860–2012
Humbert argued that decreases in clemency grants may have been at-
tributable to a higher proportion of federal prisoners who were guilty of
serious offenses and/or were “second offenders.”221 He also suggested an-
other explanation might be that the “proportions of prisoners of advanced
age and in ill health had become smaller in recent years.”222 The emergence
of good-time laws, parole, and probation may have also “eliminated the
need and the propriety of clemency in some instances.”223 Even considering
all of this, Humbert argued “the most effective influence” in “checking
growth” in acts of clemency had been “the determination of the officials,
who administered the pardoning power, to aid in the proper enforcement of
the law and to avoid any flagrant misuse of the power of executive
clemency.”224
Humbert noted, for example, that in several instances the U.S. pardon
attorney had explained high numbers of adverse clemency recommenda-
tions from officials as the result of a desire to see “more rigid enforcement
221. Id.
222. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 117.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 120.
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of the laws.”225 This mindset was again evident when a former attorney
general spoke to the American Bar Association and berated President Hoo-
ver for appearing too sympathetic with claims of “misery” and human suf-
fering in clemency applications.226
With respect to increases and decreases in clemency grants, Humbert
was less certain, if not somewhat confused. He first argued that clemency
“should be used only in extraordinary circumstances occurring irregularly
and persisting for varying lengths of time.”227 Since pardons should be used
“irregularly,” the proper use of clemency powers should “show neither a
uniform rise nor a gradual decrease.”228 Humbert again pointed to the im-
pact of good-time laws, parole, and probation to account for some of the
variation in increases and decreases of clemency grants,229 but he also rec-
ognized the impact of new rules and regulations,230 war influences,231 and
the “periodic shifting of administrative personnel.”232
For all of the mania surrounding “empirical tests” and “multivariate
modeling” in political science seventy years after the fact, political scien-
tists have made little or no effort to apply the rigor of modern methodology
to many of the relationships explored and discussed by Humbert.
The Pardoning Power of the President concluded with a summary of
major points as well as a discussion regarding potential reforms.233 The
reforms are perhaps best understood and appreciated in light of the trends
Humbert observed in the data: (1) More significant forms of clemency—
especially commutations of sentence—were decreasing. (2) Pardons to re-
store civil rights were increasing. (3) While there was variation in clemency
grants from year to year, in recent years there was a noticeable decline in its
exercise. (4) As clemency grants decreased, clemency applications in-
creased, resulting in increases in unaddressed applications.
Humbert noted that reformers had called for “greater circumspection”
in pardoning, as opposed to modifications of the pardoning process or re-
stricting the president.234 Once again, the writing was extraordinary:
Recommendations on applications for clemency of United States
Judges and Attorneys should not be relied upon to as great an
extent in the future as in the past in deciding what should be done
with applications for clemency. [Because] of the nature of the in-
formation which a judge receives on a case, because of the danger
225. Id. at 121.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 105.
229. Id. at 122–23.
230. Id. at 121.
231. Id. at 122–23.
232. Id. at 123.
233. Id. at 134–42.
234. HUMBERT, supra note 193, at 139.
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of partiality which the experiences of a judge in criminal cases
engender, and because of insufficient time to collect facts relevant
to a decision in clemency cases, the United States Judge’s recom-
mendations should be critically examined. The judges imposed
the sentence and they are loathe to admit any error in the original
sentence. Secondly, if developments following the imposition of
the sentence show the desirability of a pardon, the judges may not
be in a position to appreciate the subsequent factors demanding
clemency. . . .
This last objection applies with equal force to the practice of
relying upon the recommendations of the United States Attorneys.
The United States Attorneys who frequently reach their offices
because of political preferment, are often fired with a zeal to
make a record by numerous convictions in order to secure further
promotion. Their ardor may bring about a great number of con-
victions, some of which were unwarranted. But will these men be
willing, afterwards, to recommend clemency in the cases in which
over-zealousness brought about a wrongful conviction or too se-
vere a sentence?235
Humbert presented a second line of recommendations aimed at “better
results” in the use of the pardoning power.236 Such results could be ob-
tained by “impartial studies of detailed data on each applicant for clemency,
including the data submitted by the United States Attorneys and Judges.”237
Were “accurate, impartial, and scientific” information of this kind available,
more reasonable decisions could be made by the executive branch without
the assistance of others and “greater uniformity of treatment” would be pro-
moted.238 Humbert also argued that “better results” would “probably” be
produced by the creation of a “small board,” equipped with a staff to con-
duct “impartial studies.”239
Perhaps some measure of the sweeping scope, impact, and authority of
Humbert’s work can be seen in the fact that, for the next three and a half
decades, a mere two articles on clemency appeared in the journals of social
science. Neither of the articles was particularly impressive and only one
was written by a political scientist.
The first, appearing in the APSR,240 addressed the false impression that
one loses citizenship if convicted of a crime. In doing so, readers were
reminded of the central point in Brown’s APSR piece nine years earlier (that
federal and state rights are not synonymous), and that Congress had deter-
mined that a person may lose citizenship only upon conviction of desertion
235. Id. at 139–40.
236. Id. at 140.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 141.
239. Id. at 140.
240. James A. Gathings, Loss of Citizenship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime, 43 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1228 (1949).
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and treason.241 The second article, appearing in The Annals (and written by
a lawyer),242 argued convincingly enough that, as long as capital punish-
ment continued, pardons would clearly “remain an important element in the
administration of criminal justice.”243
One wonders how much further the pardon power may have been ne-
glected by political scientists had Gerald R. Ford not said these fateful
words on September 8, 1974:
Now, therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States,
pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II,
Section 2, of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents
do grant a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for
all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon,
has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the
period from July (January) 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974.244
C. The Post-Nixon Pardon Era
When the media create lists of “famous” or “most controversial” par-
dons, it is a telling exercise. From source to source, the lists generally look
the same: George Steinbrenner, Patricia Hearst, G. Gordon Liddy, Iran-
Contra defendants, Jimmy Carter’s post-Vietnam amnesty, Jimmy Hoffa,
Tokyo Rose, Marc Rich, and Scooter Libby. Those with a little more time
on their hands might add Eugene Debs, Confederates after the Civil War,
Mormons who practiced polygamy in the 1800s, or the Whiskey Rebels.
However, one can also generally expect that Gerald Ford’s pardon of
Richard Nixon will be confidently labeled as the “most controversial” par-
don granted in American history. Generally, most of the “controversial”
pardons listed will be pardons granted after Nixon’s, suggesting it was
some sort of game changer, or that its magnitude has, for whatever reason,
blinded us considerably to noteworthy controversies previous to 1974.245
The 1970s certainly saw an increase in political science scholarship
related to the pardon power, but that increase amounted to a mere handful
of articles appearing in less-than prestigious settings. When all was said and
done, there was actually very little attention given to Ford’s pardon of Rich-
241. Id. at 1230–31.
242. Austin W. Scott, Jr., The Pardoning Power, 284 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95
(1952).
243. Id. at 95. At least honorary mention must be given to the publication of a young lawyer
who served as Pardon Counsel to the Governor of Wisconsin and went on to enjoy a prolific
career as a political scientist. See David Adamany, Executive Clemency in Wisconsin, Wis. B.
Bull. Oct. 1963 at 54, 54.
244. Proclamation 4311, Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon, 2 PUB. PAPERS 103 (Sept. 8,
1974).
245. It is my own contention that every generation of Americans has experienced its own
unbelievable, unforgettable, end-all pardon controversy—if not three or four. But, the fact of the
matter is, we do forget, quickly and deeply. I am thus very comfortable in arguing there have been
pardon controversies quite comparable to Nixon’s.
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ard Nixon! That is to say, the popular candidate for most “controversial”
pardon of all time was all but completely invisible to the pages of the top
journals of political science.
The explanations for this circumstance are worth exploring, because
they relate to factors that are still at play today. By the 1970s, the top jour-
nals (American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Sci-
ence, and the Journal of Politics) were almost wholly given over to
empirical testing of hypotheses via statistical analysis of aggregate data.
The journalistic, reporting style of Stewart and legal discussions of Barnett
and Brown were little tolerated. Clearly data driven case studies appeared
now and then, but nothing on the more casual order of Griffin and Ewing.
The overtly normative/prescriptive analyses of Hadley, Scoville, Smithers,
Stoke, and Wilcox were simply no longer welcomed.246
This meant any scholar interested in doing a case study of the Nixon
pardon would have to look elsewhere for publication. The unique nature of
the pardon247 left little room for the building of a data set of comparative
pardons. To make matters worse, any person who mustered up the courage
to write on the topic discovered (in their review of the literature), that noth-
ing had been published on pardons in twenty-two years! The less-than-opti-
mistic author might just imagine a journal’s blind referee scribbling: “And
with good reason. Pardons are not important.”
In 1976, historian David R. Colburn went to Political Science Quar-
terly to publish his biographical sketch of Governor Alfred E. Smith.248
Smith’s views on penal reform emphasized “the return of prisoners to soci-
ety as meaningful contributors,”249 and he considered the use of pardon
boards to be the “modern, humane, scientific way to deal with the criminal
offender.”250 During his eight years in office Smith commuted several hun-
dred sentences, but few recipients returned to prison.251 Nonetheless,
Republicans tried to embarrass Smith politically by asserting that his gener-
osity with clemency was contributing to a “crime wave” in New York.252
However, Smith defended both his policies and his individual decisions in
such a deft manner that the New York Times wrote, “[t]he man who assails
him without adequate information is in for a very troublous time.”253
246. An exception being made perhaps for debates about issues related to methodology.
247. Nixon was a former president. He did not apply for the pardon. He was never tried and
convicted of any criminal offense. The pardon covers crimes he “may have” committed.
248. David R. Colburn, Governor Alfred E. Smith and Penal Reform, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 315
(1976).
249. Id. at 315.
250. Id. at 325 (quoting Alfred E. Smith, Complete Text of the Annual Message of Governor
Smith to the Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1920, at 24).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 326.
253. A Stinging Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1926, at 22.
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In 1977, William D. Pederson published an article in Presidential
Studies Quarterly, a journal which seemed to then become the unofficial
home for scholarly analysis of federal executive clemency.254 His article,
entitled “Amnesty and Presidential Behavior: A ‘Barberian’ Test,” was
mathematically simplistic—even by the standards of that day—but it con-
stituted the first empirical test of a clemency-related hypothesis in an aggre-
gate data set.255 Pederson employed Gary M. Maranell’s questionnaire
study of 600 American historians to devise a typology of presidents com-
patible with the typology presented in James David Barber’s The Presiden-
tial Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.256 Pederson
then correlated these character types with forty “formal amnesties granted
by means of proclamation or executive order.”257
Pederson concluded presidential amnesty was a “tradition that de-
pend[ed] on presidential character.”258 The results showed ninety percent of
the amnesties were granted by “active-presidents” and a majority (fifty-five
percent) was granted by “active-positive” presidents.259 Looking further,
Pederson found “active-positive” presidents have shown “more willingness
to use their clemency power in broader ways.”260
A second aberration from our general chronology is appropriate here,
as Pederson’s analysis was essentially retested by P.S. Ruckman, Jr., in
1995.261 Using a data set of 19,899 individual acts of clemency, Ruckman
found “active” presidents accounted for a full 73% of the population of
grants, from 1900 to 1993.262 In addition, “active-positive” presidents ac-
counted for a plurality of such grants.263 Ruckman also found the percent-
age of clemency actions that were grants (as opposed to denials) was
sensitive to both the “active” and “positive” components of Barber’s typol-
ogy, as was willingness to use clemency in a variety of ways.264 Ruckman
concluded that the data provided further evidence that presidential character
254. No less than nine such articles appeared in Presidential Studies Quarterly from 1977 to
2008.
255. William D. Pederson, Amnesty and Presidential Behavior: A “Barberian” Test, 7 PRESI-
DENTIAL STUD. Q. 175 (1977).
256. Id. at 176; JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORM-
ANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 11–14 (1993). Barber’s typology was constructed along two dimen-
sions: world view (positive or negative) and activity level (active or passive). The four character
types were thus: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, and passive-negative.
257. Pederson, supra note 255, at 177.
258. Id. at 179.
259. Id. Table 2.
260. Id. at 180.
261. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Presidential Character and Executive Clemency: A Reexamination, 76
SOC. SCI. Q. 213 (1995).
262. Id. at 218–19.
263. Id. at 218, Table 1 (41.7%).
264. Id. Data included pardons, commutations of sentence, remissions of fines and forfeiture,
and respites.
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was a “critical factor” in the clemency process,265 but emphasized more
“rigorous” tests of rival clemency hypotheses were both desirable and pos-
sible.266 More specifically, he called for “multivariate time-series models of
executive clemency policy.”267
Two years later, John M. Orman and Dorothy Rudoni penned an essay
that basically made the point that the underlying dimensions of the pardon
power are far from unique. They are, instead, perfectly consistent with the
president’s broad discretionary powers in criminal justice policy.268 The
United States Constitution sets the stage for this broad discretion by declar-
ing that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”269 Orman and Rudoni explained that “[t]he Department of Justice is
the President’s primary instrument for law enforcement . . . [and the] Crimi-
nal Division of the Justice Department . . . has responsibility for all federal
prosecutions.”270 However, the decisions by federal officials to prosecute,
or not prosecute, were “in a sense less subject to popularly based political
review than such decisions [at] the local level.”271 The authors argued “dis-
proportionate partisan influence” and “selective deployment of executive
power” were serious concerns272 but noted judicial review of prosecutorial
decision making was “almost totally absent.”273
Of course, presidents also have broad discretion with respect to the
individuals they appoint—including their direction, supervision, and re-
moval, as well as how they will be handled when there are “episodes”
which might hurt the president politically.274 Finally, presidents have dis-
cretion with respect to symbolic leadership, the rhetoric they employ, the
messages they send, and the degree to which words and actions appear to be
correlated.275 Orman and Rudoni offered some suggestions for reigning in
this vast network of discretion, but none were related to the specific use of
the pardon power.276
265. Id. at 220.
266. Id. at 220–21.
267. Ruckman, supra note 261, at 221.
268. John M. Orman & Dorothy Rudoni, Exercise of the President’s Discretionary Power in
Criminal Justice Policy, 9 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 415, 416–17 (1979).
269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
270. Orman & Rudoni, supra note 268, at 417.
271. Id. at 418.
272. Id. at 421–22.
273. Id. at 418 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY 209 (1969)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 423–25.
276. The perspective of the authors was somewhat at odds with that of Austin Sarat, who
viewed clemency powers as “breaching the boundary between the rule of law and monarchical
privilege” and generally existing in the “barely chartable borderland” of the law. See Austin Sarat,
At the Boundaries of Law: Executive Clemency, Sovereign Prerogative, and the Dilemma of
American Legality, 57 AM. Q. 611, 615, 618 (2005). In Mercy On Trial: What it Means to Stop an
Execution, Sarat described clemency as “outside of, or beyond, the law and thus a threat to a
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 32 10-MAY-13 13:56
814 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
Christopher Joyner wrote a brief essay on the history, scope, and legal
implications of the pardon power for Federal Probation in 1979.277 How-
ever, it was David Shichor and Donald R. Ranish who brought clemency
back to the pages of Presidential Studies Quarterly, in 1980, with a discus-
sion of Jimmy Carter’s Vietnam Amnesty.278 On his first day in office,
Carter provided a “full, complete and unconditional pardon” for Vietnam-
era draft resisters.279 The amnesty, however, left the fate of deserters to the
Pentagon and military courts.280
Shichor and Ranish explored the “social effects and consequences” of
the decision281 and observed that the draft resistance movement “from its
outset” was comprised “mainly of white middle-class students, or ex-stu-
dents.”282 In contrast, the authors noted that it had been “demonstrated” that
military deserters “in large part had lower-class social backgrounds”283 and
that there was a “high level of congruence” between “minority group mem-
bership and lower-class status.”284 They added:
Young adults from lower-class backgrounds and minorities were
the first to be drafted, since most of them did not have the legal
grounds to be deferred, they lacked the knowledge of the law to
arrange for a deferment, and also did not have the financial means
to flee the country like many of the draft dodgers did.285
Anticipation of controversial pardons related to the Iran-Contra affair
probably prompted Mark J. Rozell’s 1989 useful “bibliographic essay” on
the pardon power286 and David Gray Adler’s very fine essay in Thomas
Cronin’s Inventing the Presidency.287 After discussing the pardon process,
the origins of the pardon power, pardon in the United States, and limitations
on the power, Adler concluded that the power had, “on the whole,” been
“judiciously administered, and so the country has been well served.”288
society dedicated to the rule of law.” AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP
AN EXECUTION 69 (2005).
277. Christopher Joyner, Rethinking the President’s Power of Executive Pardon, 43 FED. PRO-
BATION, 1979 at 16. Despite the intriguing nature of the title, the article is really more of a sum-
mary and very basic introduction to the topic of pardons.
278. David Shichor & Donald R. Ranish, President Carter’s Vietnam Amnesty: An Analysis of
a Public Policy Decision, 10 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443 (1980).
279. Proclamation No. 4833, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 21, 1977) (executive order relating to
proclamation of pardon titled: Granting Pardon for Violations of the Selective Service Act, August
4, 1964 to March 28, 1973).
280. Shichor & Ranish, supra note 278, at 445.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 447.
283. MICHAEL USEEM, CONSCRIPTION, PROTEST AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 145 (1973).
284. Id.
285. Shichor & Ranish, supra note 278, at 447.
286. Mark J. Rozell, The Presidential Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 5 J. L. & POL.
459 (1989).
287. DAVID GRAY ADLER, The President’s Pardon Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRES-
IDENCY 209 (Thomas Cronin ed., 1989).
288. Id. at 230.
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However, he suggested that pre-conviction pardons “ought to be discour-
aged as a matter of public policy,”289 and the “possibility” of future shelter-
ing of “high ranking officials” was reason enough to “rethink the
constitutional structure governing the pardon power.”290
Adler found “merit,” for example, in Walter Mondale’s 1974 proposal
to allow two-thirds of Congress to “disapprove of [a] pardon within 180
days of issuance.”291 In his view, the nation had “nothing to lose by such a
constitutional amendment, and it would have much to gain.”292
Christopher E. Smith and Scott P. Johnson’s article in The Wayne Law
Review,293 agreed that “the appropriate scope” of the pardon power de-
served “examination and reassessment” in light of the possibility that a
president “could halt criminal proceedings in order to suppress information
about his own misdeeds.”294 After calling attention to the shortcomings of
independent counsel proceedings, civil liability, the news media, checks
and balances, and the electorate as a means of protection from such abuse,
Smith and Johnson suggested that the “most desirable” protection would be
to disallow pardons before trial.295 An “alternative approach” would be a
“requirement that the President specify charges when issuing a pardon” so
that “unspecified charges would remain fair targets for prosecution.”296 In
their view, even though these limitations “would not harm the greater pur-
poses of the pardon power,”297 it would be entirely too difficult to “generate
sufficient political momentum” for a constitutional amendment.298 Instead,
such changes would probably have to come through interpretation (or, re-
interpretation) of the Constitution by the federal courts.299
Amazingly, this author’s review uncovered a single article on Gerald
Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon. A full twenty years after the fact, Mark J.
Rozell focused on the constitutionality of President Ford’s decision.300
More specifically, Rozell reviewed arguments related to the timing of the
pardon (previous to conviction), the Constitution’s impeachment exception,
the vagueness of Ford’s proclamation, and supposed violations of special
289. Id. at 229.
290. Id. at 230.
291. S.J. Res. 240, 93rd Cong. (1974); see also Walter Mondale, Harnessing the President’s
Pardon Power, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1975, at 108–10.
292. ADLER, supra note 287, at 230.
293. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and Accountability in the
Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1989).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1124.
296. Id. at 1125.
297. Id. at 1125–26.
298. Id. at 1128.
299. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and Accountability in the
Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1128 (1989).
300. Mark J. Rozell, President Ford’s Pardon of Richard M. Nixon: Constitutional and Politi-
cal Considerations, 24 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 121 (1994).
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prosecutor regulations301 and concluded “the weight of evidence [was] in
favor of the pardon . . . as constitutionally proper.”302 As for amending the
Constitution in reaction to Ford’s pardon, Rozell considered it “doubtful
that any constitutional or statutory remedy . . . [was] necessary, proper, or
desirable.”303 In his view, the separation of powers provided “all of the
necessary checks against potential abuses of the pardoning power.”304 Ro-
zell observed:
[L]imiting the president’s pardoning power with any additional
legislative check would defeat the purpose of the framers having
given the president large discretionary authority to pardon in the
first place. The pardon is primarily an act of mercy and must
therefore be left in the hands of one person and not in the hands
of a large deliberative assembly where many representatives will
be influenced by temporary partisan passions. Only one person—
the president—should be responsible for weighing the needs of
justice and the national interest against the partisan passions of
the day, and make the final determination as to the proper course
of action.305
In 1997, P.S. Ruckman, Jr. revisited aggregate data on clemency with
an aim, once again, toward encouraging “multivariate statistical analy-
ses.”306 With some reliance on Humbert and anecdotal data, Ruckman iden-
tified three broad categories of formal, public explanations for clemency
decisions. Explanations which were legal or technical in nature, focused on
concerns about innocence, consideration of mitigating factors, the desire for
proportionate punishment, etc.307 Decisions based on humanitarian com-
passion or mercy tended to receive more critical attention.308 Deathbed par-
dons fell under this category, as did so-called “Christmas pardons.”309 A
final category of pardon explanations focused on judgments regarding re-
form or rehabilitation of the recipient.310 Ruckman argued all of these ex-
planations could be the byproduct of the social background characteristics
of presidents, presidential character, public opinion, the social status of the
prisoner, and changes in the rules administering pardons as well as war.311
Turning to the data, he found seventeen administrations (from William
McKinley to George H.W. Bush) averaged almost 200 acts of clemency per
301. Id. at 123–25.
302. Id. at 126.
303. Id. at 133.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 134.
306. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, and
Analysis (1900–1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 251 (1997).
307. Id. at 257.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 257–58.
310. Id. at 258.
311. Id. at 258–60.
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year312—something most Americans would not know, and probably would
not guess, and a fact that also dispelled the notion that the typical act of
clemency was “controversial” or required the expenditure of some great
political capital. Ruckman found Democratic presidents had a higher aver-
age for grants than Republicans,313 and, more tellingly, that Democrats
were more likely to have a higher average positive grant rate (when calcu-
lating percentages both from the total number of applications or the total
number of applications that resulted in some decision).314 A second notable
feature of the data was the very sorry record of the Reagan and Bush
administrations.315
Ruckman finally introduced data that he judged appropriate for mul-
tivariate analysis: the percentage of requests granted per fiscal year.316
These data revealed a long-term, downward trend, which originated much
earlier in time than the Reagan and Bush administrations.317 The downward
trend may have been the result of “Republican dominance in the White
House,” the “law and order” campaigns of Richard Nixon, and/or the ad-
vent of the retributive justice model.318 While the occurrence of war did not
have an obvious impact on the data, Ruckman found that the percentage of
positive clemency actions tended to increase throughout the term of an ad-
ministration, peaking in the last fiscal year.319 In sum, the piece presented a
solid basis upon which future multivariate analyses could be conducted.
Also conscious of the lack of sophisticated mathematical study of par-
don power, Mark Morris wrote an essay on the “Overlooked Relevance of
the Pardon Power.”320 Examining data on pardons and commutations of
sentence, from 1900 to 1996, Morris concluded “Democrats ha[d] used the
[pardon] power with greater frequency than Republicans.”321 In his view,
however, the noticeable pattern of decline began in the administration of
Lyndon Johnson.322 Regardless, Morris saw the apparent decline as an ap-
propriate topic of research, as well as the social background characteristics
of pardon recipients and the kinds of crimes addressed in clemency war-
rants.323 He also suggested further exploration of the “normative” question
312. Ruckman, supra note 306, at 261.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 263, Table 2.
315. Id. Reagan and Bush left, on average sixty-six and sixty-one percent of clemency appli-
cations pending. On average, only thirteen and five percent of their actions were positive (result-
ing in a grant).
316. Id. at 264.
317. Id.
318. Ruckman, supra note 306, at 264–65.
319. Id. at 265.
320. Mark Morris, The Overlooked Relevance of the Pardon Power, in PRESIDENTIAL FRON-
TIERS: UNDEREXPLORED ISSUES IN WHITE HOUSE POLITICS 79 (Ryan J. Barilleaux, ed., 1998).
321. Id. at 90.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 90–92.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 36 10-MAY-13 13:56
818 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
of potential restraints on the president’s power324 and the role that the me-
dia play in the use (or non-use) of clemency.325 Morris later co-authored an
article on the pardon power with Jody C. Baumgartner326 that utilized the
case study method to compare and contrast the pardon power in the United
States and in Russia.
To Morris’s credit, his review of the literature spotted one of the earli-
est multivariate models of executive clemency.327 The author, P.S. Ruck-
man, Jr. had, by that point, used Microfilm Set T967 (National Archives) to
create a data set of every individual act of clemency, from 1789 to 1883.328
In 1999, a portion of these data was first featured in a Presidential Studies
Quarterly article on Abraham Lincoln’s use of the pardon power.329 The
examination of more than 300 individual clemency warrants found Lincoln
pardoned the largest number of individuals in the fourth year of his first
term,330 and about one-third of his clemency warrants were issued to of-
fenders in “border states.”331 The most common explanations for granting
clemency referenced good behavior after the offense, a sense of repentance,
a life of good behavior before the offense, and the youth of the offender.332
Finally, Lincoln’s clemency warrants featured unprecedented influence by
public opinion, resulting in a somewhat democratic twist to the use of a
seemingly imperial power.333
324. Id. at 92.
325. Id. at 94–95.
326. Jody C. Baumgartner & Mark H. Morris, Presidential Power Unbound: A Comparative
Look at Presidential Pardon Power, 29 POL. & POL’Y 209 (2001).
327. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal Executive Clemency in the United States, 1934–94: An Em-
pirical Analysis, (Nov. 6–9, 1996) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia).
328. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency 1789–1993, A Preliminary Report, (Nov. 1995)
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa,
Florida).
329. P.S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making, 29
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84, 90–95 (1999).
330. Id. at 90.
331. Id. at 91.
332. Id. at 93.
333. Id. at 94–95.
Fifty ‘respectable citizens’ from the territory of Nebraska, for example, supported
the warrant of James Corrigan (convicted of manslaughter). ‘Many hundred respectable
citizens at large’ joined the senators, representatives and state legislators from Minne-
sota, as well as the governor, in supporting the warrant of Luther Preston (convicted of
stealing from the mails). The warrant of John H. Murphy (convicted of manslaughter)
mentions jurors, aldermen, city councilmen, the register, the collector, and ‘nearly one
thousand citizens of the District of Columbia.’ Joseph S. Hewins (convicted of mail
robbery) received support from a postmaster, the president of a railroad company, a
sheriff, a collector, many ‘well-known persons’ of ‘undoubted veracity,’ and ‘over
eleven-hundred’ citizens and acquaintances in Massachusetts. The warrant of Daniel
Loudersmith (convicted of forging applications for pensions) was supported by a ‘large
majority’ of the members of the Pennsylvania state legislature and ‘several thousand
citizens.’
Id. at 94.
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In 1999, Scott P. Johnson and Christopher E. Smith passionately an-
nounced the clear “need” to restrict the pardon power (because of its
“flawed and potentially self-serving component”), and fearlessly predicted
that it was “only a matter of time” before it was used in a manner that
would “jeopardize a President’s place in history.”334 Had the focus of their
article been slightly broader, they might have been the James David Barber
of our generation.335 But, as it turned out, Johnson and Smith were not so
much concerned about the kinds of pardon abuse that were just around the
corner (at the end of the Clinton administration). Instead, they were con-
cerned about the use of pardons “to conceal criminal behavior or inappro-
priate conduct from the public.”336
Along the way, they made a contextual observation surprisingly miss-
ing from almost all discussions of clemency reform:
The modern presidency is far different than the vision of the exec-
utive possessed by those who wrote the Constitution. The framers
‘assumed that the president would be a political eunuch, with the
duty of only assuring that laws passed by Congress, which is
where the political action would occur, be faithfully executed.’
Over the course of two hundred years, the presidency has been
transformed into a powerful office—one which initiates policies
and exerts substantial control over foreign affairs and other mat-
ters . . . . In light of the expansive power of presidents, serious
questions emerge concerning how people in a democracy will
maintain accountability over a powerful official who has many
people working on his or her behalf, both in the executive branch
of government and in the President’s political party.337
Johnson and Smith recognized “several mechanisms hypothetically
available” to prevent presidents from “exceeding . . . constitutional powers
or committing harmful misdeeds” (independent counsel proceedings, civil
liability, the news media, checks and balances, etc.).338 They insisted, how-
ever, that pardons should be withheld until after conviction.339 In addition,
they argued the presidents should have to “specify charges” when issuing
pardons.340 These restrictions would leave the “greater purposes of the par-
334. Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, White House Scandals and the Presidential
Pardon Power: Persistent Risks and Prospects for Reform, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 907, 928, 929
(1999).
335. It was Barber, a political scientist, who famously predicted, in the pages of the Sept. 12,
1969, issue of Time magazine, that Richard Nixon—if elected—might “commit himself irrevoca-
bly to some disastrous course of action.” Such behavior, said Barber, stemmed from “a very
strong drive for personal power—especially independent power.” James Barber, The President’s
Analyst, TIME, Sept. 12, 1969, at 62.
336. Johnson & Smith, supra note 334, at 929.
337. Id. at 912–13.
338. Id. at 913.
339. Id. at 923.
340. Id. at 925.
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don power . . . intact.”341 Perhaps most radically, the article called on the
United States Supreme Court to apply “pragmatic considerations” and ad-
just (limit) the president’s power.342
D. The Post-Clinton Era
As Bill Clinton stepped into the office of the presidency, the number of
applications for federal executive clemency jumped to their highest level in
almost thirty years.343 It was thus more than a little ironic that the first
Democratic administration in some time quickly established a record of
stinginess when it came to the pardoning power.344 The irony thickened
further when the president, who was criticized by some for using the power
so infrequently,345 drew additional (and even sharper) criticism by becom-
ing a wellspring of mercy at the end of his second term.346 On January 20,
with only a few hours left in his presidency, Clinton granted 140 pardons
and 36 commutations of sentence.347
341. Id. at 926. Johnson and Smith noted the Founders’ concern about insurrections and rebel-
lions would be hardly affected by such restrictions, in part, because, after two hundred plus years,
the government had become “more stable.” In addition, pardons could still be used for public
welfare purposes and for securing testimony.
342. Johnson & Smith, supra note 334, at 927.
343. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 200. There were 698
applications for clemency in fiscal year 1993 (up from 379 in fiscal year 1992 and 318 in 1991)
and 808 in fiscal year 1994. The 1994 figure was the highest since 1967, when there were 863
applications for clemency.
344. Clinton’s first pardons were granted 672 days into the administration—a record for delay.
No previous president had waited more than 300 days. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Obama: Nearing
900 Day Mark, PARDON POWER BLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www.pardonpower.com/2011/07/
obama-nearing-900-day-mark.html.
345. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Wielding the Ultimate Instrument of Legal Forgiveness, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1996, at A21; Margaret Love, A Place for Pardons, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1998, at
A29; Kathleen Dean Moore, Mr. President, Misusing This Power Is Unpardonable, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2001, at B2; Russell Max Simon, Presidential Pardons Get Greater Scrutiny: In the
Scandal-Tinged Atmosphere of Washington, the End-of-Term Rite Seems Increasingly Tainted by
Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2000; Richard Willing, Presidential Pardons a Rarer
Event, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1998, at 18A.
346. See, e.g., Peter Grier, Clinton’s Suspect Pardons ‘Pardongate’ Sours Ex-President’s Leg-
acy, His Wife’s Image, and Public View of Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 23, 2001;
Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Clinton Pardons Raise Questions of Timing, Motive, LOS ANGE-
LES TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, at A1; Michael Powell, Pardons With Precedent; Marc Rich Drama is
Latest in a Long Line of Last Acts, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at C.1; Dave Saltonstall, Bill’s
Very Bumpy Road from White House: Pardons, Softgate Has Pals Muttering ‘Tacky,’ ‘Sordid’,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2001, at 6; Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, 47 Pardons Skirted
Review, Papers Show, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A1; Peter Slevin & George Lardner,
Jr., Rush of Pardons Unusual in Scope, Lack of Scrutiny; Back-Door Lobbying Had Large Role in
Clinton’s Decisions, Observers Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at A.3.
347. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., PARDONS GRANTED BY PRESIDENT
WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1993–2001), http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clintonpardon_grants.htm.; OF-
FICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., COMMUTATIONS, REMISSIONS, AND REPRIEVES
GRANTED BY PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1993–2001), http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clin-
ton_comm.htm.
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These infamous “last-minute” pardons were, in part, notable because
they generated unprecedented interest in information about historical trends
in the use of the pardoning power. Previously, when presidents granted the
occasional “controversial” pardon, the tendency of commentators and ad-
ministration officials was to focus on the particular case and compare it
with a previous case, or small list of selected cases. Supporters of the ad-
ministration would find examples of similar decisions and critics empha-
sized idiosyncrasies to dramatize the argument that the president’s pardon
was “unprecedented,” “unheard of,” “a first,” etc.
However, Clinton’s “last minute” pardons clearly sparked broader, so-
phisticated interests. The New York Times investigated patterns in clemency
applications across several years348 and reporters for the Los Angeles Times
wondered if “other presidents [had] pardoned as many individuals whose
applications were not first reviewed by the Justice Department.”349 The
New York Daily News also wondered about the number of times previous
presidents had “bypassed traditional channels” to grant pardons.350 USA To-
day was curious about the Department of Justice’s role in the clemency
process and what limits there were to the president’s use of the pardoning
power351 while reporters from the Washington Post and Christian Science
Monitor questioned whether “last-minute” pardons were “the norm.”352 For
the first time, calls for empirical analysis of the pardon power were coming
from outside the discipline of political science.
While the dust of the Clinton pardons hovered in the air, Sam Morison,
an attorney-advisor in the OPA recommended that the individual clemency
warrants on Microfilm Set T967 be combined with individual warrants
signed afterward in a single, researchable database.353 Most importantly, the
database would include those warrants signed from 1932 to 2001.354 Data
Management International scanned all of the documents and created a sys-
tem index to make the database researchable.355 As a result, for the first
time since the 1930s, researchers can examine individual clemency war-
348. Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Moss, Rising Numbers Sought Pardons in Last 2 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A.1.
349. Peterson & Getter, supra note 346, at A1; Serrano & Braun, supra note 346, at A1.
350. Saltonstall, supra note 346, at 6.
351. Judy Keen, Process Intended to Keep ‘Tranquility’, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2001, at A.6.
352. Grier, supra note 346; Powell, supra note 346, at C.1.
353. E-mail from Sam Morison, (Nov. 17, 2011, 19:31) (on file with author).
354. E-mail from Ronald L. Rodgers, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,
(Nov. 17, 2011, 01:23) (on file with author) (response to Freedom of Information Request No.
2012-012).
355. Id. Unfortunately, the warrants featured in the CD set do not line up perfectly with aggre-
gate data reported by the OPA. In 2012, the author also discovered that almost 150 pardons
granted by Martin Van Buren were missing from the CDs. The OPA pledged the database would
be “fixed.” E-mail from Brenda McElroy, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,
(July 18, 2012, 07:42) (on file with author).
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rants, a significant improvement over aggregate data arranged by fiscal year
(offered in the Annual Report of the Attorney General).
Whatever the desire may have been for empirical analysis of the par-
don power, Louis Fisher heaped more than a little scorn on President Clin-
ton’s use of the pardon power in the pages of Presidential Studies
Quarterly.356 With particular attention on the FALN pardons and “Marc
Rich et al.,” Fisher persuasively argued Clinton’s decision-making “did
lasting damage” to his presidency and evidenced “a lack of professionalism,
discipline, and judgment.”357
Michael Genovese and Kristine Almquist’s attempt to “evaluate Clin-
ton’s exercise of the pardon authority” was another story.358 Although they
held Clinton’s pardons “generally rivaled” the Nixon pardon and the Iran-
Contra pardons, Genovese and Almquist insisted Clinton was “by no means
alone in issuing questionable pardons”359 and certainly “not the first.”360
They even argued Clinton’s infamous “eleventh-hour pardons” were some-
thing of a “presidential custom.”361
Genovese and Almquist sought to explain “the outcry against Clin-
ton”362 (“perhaps . . . much ado about nothing”).363 Genovese and Almquist
concluded “ethical questions” may have generated “moral outrage” toward
the pardon, for example, of fugitive millionaire (and Clinton donor) Marc
Rich. But they appeared equally convinced that the controversy was the
result of Republicans who “overreacted,” “pounced even before the facts
were in,”364 and never seemed to “tire” of trying to “punish” or “destroy”
Clinton.365 Genovese and Almquist appeared almost baffled that many were
even more “skeptical” when Clinton “defended” his pardons in a New York
Times editorial.366
356. Louis Fisher, “The Law:” When Presidential Power Backfires: Clinton’s Use of Clem-
ency, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 586, 586 (2002).
357. Id. at 598.
358. Michael Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton: Tested but
Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 75, 85 (David Gray Adler &
Michael A. Genovese, eds., 2002).
359. Id. at 83, 85.
360. Id. at 87.
361. Id. at 84.
362. Id. at 86.
363. Id. at 85.
364. Genovese & Almquist, supra note 358, at 85.
365. Id. at 86.
366. Id. Clinton’s Times editorial was a train wreck along so many dimensions. It attempted to
contextualize the pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green by referencing other “extremely contro-
versial” uses of the clemency power. Notably, none of the examples involved individuals who
were exceptionally wealthy or suspected of having close financial ties to the president or a first
lady. Nor did any of the examples feature a major financial contributor to the president’s party, or
a fugitive from justice. Clinton compared aggregate statistics on his use of the pardoning power
with presidents before him, without mentioning that more than sixty-five percent of his pardons
were granted in the last year, and final six weeks, of his last term. Nor did Clinton mention the
fact that he may have also allowed more pardon applicants to bypass the Department of Justice
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Almost as an afterthought, Genovese and Almquist wrote that “seri-
ous” discussions of clemency reform begin with Walter Mondale’s 1974
proposal to allow Congress to vote to disapprove pardons.367 They agreed
with Adler that Mondale’s proposal “could go far in affording the nation
meaningful protection” against pardon abuses by deterring presidents “from
granting pardons under suspicious circumstances.”368
Beau Breslin and lawyer John J.P. Howley published what they called
an “unapologetically normative” discussion of the “political nature of the
clemency process” in 2002.369 In something of a twist, Breslin and Howley
expressed concerns with attempts to “mitigate the impact of politics” on the
clemency decision making process, particularly in cases involving the death
penalty.370 As they saw it, the judicial process brought with it “a level of
rigidity,” and “formal procedures and standards tend[ed] to shield the deci-
sion-maker from personal responsibility and accountability.”371 The clem-
ency process, on the other hand, “should be more personal and more
human.”372 Although certainly a “component” of our legal system, it bore
“no significant relation to the judicial process,” and any attempt to make it
so would do more harm than good.373
In 2003, John Dinan updated Christen Jensen’s survey of the pardon
power in the states in a provocative manner.374 Dinan reviewed the remain-
ing records of more than 230 state constitutional conventions and “ex-
amine[d] the distinctive conceptions of the pardon power that had prevailed
at the state level.”375 His ultimate goal, however, was to get a sense of
than any president before him. Clinton observed other companies that were indicted for similar
offenses were sued civilly, not criminally and that two “highly regarded” tax experts agreed Rich
and Green had no unreported income or tax liability related to the transactions that were scruti-
nized even though they had paid a large amount of fines. In fact, there were about fifty criminal
cases brought against crude oil resellers in the late 1980s and, consequently, over a dozen defend-
ants served some time in prison. And the tax experts (Bernard Wolfman and Martin Ginsburg)
were paid almost $100,000 by Rich to conduct their analysis. All of their findings rested upon the
somewhat risky assumption that the materials provided to them by Rich’s attorney were an accu-
rate and complete representation of the government’s case. Clinton argued the case for pardon had
been “reviewed and advocated” by “three distinguished Republican attorneys.” As for the attor-
neys; Leonard Garment said the column was “absolutely false.” He had “nothing” to do with the
pardons. William Bradford Reynolds said he “never, never, never had any discussions about a
pardon” and a White House spokesman said the third lawyer, Lewis Libby, was “in no way,
shape, or form involved with the pardon.” All along the way, Clinton’s explanations were laced
with language like “I understood that . . .” and “I was informed that . . . .”
367. Id.
368. Id. at 86–87.
369. Beau Breslin & John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR. L. REV.
231, 232 (2002).
370. Id. at 233.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 234.
373. Id. at 239.
374. John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35
POLITY 389 (2003).
375. Id. at 392.
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whether or not these varied approaches shed some insight as to what con-
siderations might then be “applicable to the federal system.”376 There fol-
lowed an interesting discussion of the manner in which state conventions
debated who should wield the pardon power and under what restrictions, if
any.377 Dinan found a majority of states chose to “deviate” from the federal
model, by the creation of advisory boards, councils, or some body of per-
sons that shared the power with the governor.378 With respect to limitations
on the pardon power, the federal model enjoyed “mixed success.”379 Many
states required “advance notice that a pardon [was] being considered.”380
Many “demand[ed] that pardons be accompanied by reasons for their issu-
ance.”381 Most states explicitly prohibited pre-conviction pardons.382
Should federal practice be informed by developments in the states?
Dinan was not sure the president was as proximate to (or as personally
involved in) the pardon process as a typical governor might be, so many of
the concerns behind the need for independent bodies might not have ap-
plied.383 In addition, the president had the OPA to process applications and
make recommendations. Dinan worried, however, that “contemporary presi-
dents” had become “more susceptible . . . to entreaties from pardon appli-
cants and their friends and families.”384 One possible solution might be an
executive order by each incoming president creating an advisory body.
Although multivariate models of federal executive clemency date back
to 1994,385 in 2006 Andrew B. Whitford and Holona Ochs became the first
political scientists to actually publish the findings of such a model in a
political science journal.386 Within a year, a second such model, by H. Ab-
bie Erler, appeared in Presidential Studies Quarterly.387 At least on the sur-
face, each of these articles had the markings of the typical article one might
find today, in the more prestigious journals of the discipline. However, a
closer look also revealed the somewhat primitive state of clemency
research.
376. Id. at 392–93.
377. Id. 394–404.
378. Id. at 403.
379. Id. at 411.
380. Dinan, supra note 374, at 411.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 412–13.
384. Id. at 413.
385. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States, 1900–1993: An Empirical
Analysis, (Sept. 2, 1994) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci-
ence Association, New York, New York).
386. Andrew B. Whitford & Holona Ochs, The Political Roots of Executive Clemency, 34 AM.
POL. RES. 825 (2006).
387. H. Abbie Erler, Executive Clemency or Bureaucratic Discretion? Two Models of the
Pardons Process, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 427 (2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 43 10-MAY-13 13:56
2012] THE STUDY OF MERCY 825
Even a casual glance at the reference sections in these articles revealed
the normal path to publication was not operative.388 Whitford and Ochs
referenced only five of almost forty articles and books on clemency appear-
ing before they went to press, and only two of nineteen articles and books
written since the 1980s.389 Amazingly, Humbert was not referenced at all.
Even research and commentary focusing on the same data employed by
Whitford and Ochs (aggregate statistics on clemency, arranged by fiscal
year, originating from the Department of Justice) were ignored390 or, in one
instance, swiftly dismissed as being merely “historical.”391 Similarly,
Erler’s piece cited only five works from the entire literature, without refer-
ence to three of four previous studies that employed the same data set—
including Whitford and Ochs!392 This means the clemency literature can
now boast of having two multivariate statistical analyses in print, but
neither is particularly connected to the rest of the literature, or even to each
other.
The consequences of a lack of communication with the previous litera-
ture were obvious. There was so little of substance regarding clemency in
the Whitford and Ochs piece, it might be better described a statistical test of
a theory regarding the residual effects of “[inter]institutional signaling” that
just happened to employ aggregate data on clemency.393 The authors
claimed to move “beyond [the] anecdotal evidence” that contributed to the
“belief” or “widespread conventional wisdom” that presidential pardons
were “political”—without explaining what exactly that meant, or identify-
ing anyone who held such a view, especially in relation to broad trends in
aggregate data.394
The statistical model found the percentage of applications denied in
fiscal years from 1954 through 1994395 was correlated with such factors as
388. Normally, journal editors send un-attributed manuscripts to two or three anonymous re-
viewers, persons with expertise in a particular field of study and/or adept at a statistical technique
employed by the author(s). Reviewers who are substantive experts ensure the related literature on
the topic is acknowledged in a competent fashion and fairly reviewed. In most instances, they also
ensure that the piece flows reasonably from the previous literature and/or provides some signifi-
cant improvement to it. Methodological experts, of course, ensure statistical techniques have been
correctly applied and interpreted.
389. Whitford & Ochs, supra note 386, at 843–46.
390. Ruckman, supra note 306; Morris, supra note 320.
391. Whitford & Ochs, supra note 386, at 829 (in reference to Ruckman, supra note 306).
Whitford and Ochs claimed political scientists had been “notably silent in recent years on the
political determinants of the use of the power to pardon”—a dubious statement at best. Yet, at
page 836, they observed (without a reference) the notion that conservative presidents were “less
likely to exercise the power of the pardon” was “supported in the literature.”
392. Erler, supra note 387, at 446–48.
393. Whitford & Ochs, supra note 386, at 832.
394. Id. at 825–26.
395. The dependent “variable [was] constructed by adding the clemency applications pending
and received to obtain the processed applications; then, dividing the number of applications de-
nied by the number of applications processed. This variable is then transformed to the logarithm
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the percentage of lines in “the State of the Union Address dedicated to the
problem of crime and criminal justice concerns,”396 the percentage of cases
the Supreme Court heard in a given year concerning criminal justice issues
(but excluding the due process rights of prisoners),397 the percentage of
entries in a random sample of the New York Times Index that dealt with
criminal justice issues,398 the percentage of Gallup respondents who named
crime as “the most important problem [that faced] the nation,”399 and the
national homicide rate.400 The exercise led Whitford and Ochs to the con-
clusion that the practice of pardon was “constitutional, yet political” and
“unilateral, yet constrained.”401
Erler also examined aggregate data on pardons, from 1953 to 2000,
arranged by fiscal year.402 Whatever the weaknesses in her bibliography,
she at least displayed greater sensitivity to (if not outright awareness of)
some of the concerns of the many scholars who had written before her. In
her view, the issuance of pardons had “dropped precipitously since Ronald
Reagan took office in 1980.”403 On the other hand, she found “no corre-
sponding decline in the number of clemency applications.”404 Erler also
found that, in half of the administrations in her study, “the highest pardon
rate . . . occur[red] during the final year in office.”405
She then tested two models of the clemency process, one “which iden-
tif[ied] the president as the main decision maker” and a second which
“identif[ied] officials within the Justice Department as the most important
set of actors in the pardons process.”406 The first model controlled for the
lame duck status of presidents, presidential approval ratings, war, and the
political party of the president.407 The second controlled for the crime rate,
the beginning of the term, and the number of applications pending (wor-
kload).408 Each model was applied to the number of applications per fiscal
year, the percentage of applications approved, and the number of pardons
granted.409
of the odds, given the bounding implicit in a measure of grouped data that are expressed as a
proportion.” Id. at 830.
396. Id. at 832.
397. Id. at 834, 842.
398. Id. at 834.
399. Whitford & Ochs, supra note 386, at 834.
400. Id. at 835.
401. Id. at 841.
402. Erler, supra note 387, at 431.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 431–32.
405. Id. at 433.
406. Id. at 434, 437.
407. Id. at 434–37.
408. Erler, supra note 387, at 437–39.
409. Id. at 440.
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Erler found the “presidential model” did an “adequate job of predicting
the number of applications received.”410 None of its variables, however,
were statistically significant with respect to the percentage of applications
approved or the number of pardons granted.411 When Erler retested the
model for the number of pardons controlling for the Ford and Carter Viet-
nam amnesties the war variable was statistically significant.412 Increases
were associated with war.413 Decreases were associated with Republican
administrations and (unexpectedly) lame duck status.414
On the other hand, the variables in the “agency model” (crime rate,
beginning of the term, application pending, and number of applications de-
nied) were statistically significant with respect to both the number of appli-
cations and the percentage of applications approved.415 In a final model,
these variables remained significant when controlling for changes in the
rules for the pardon process in 1983.416 Erler concluded in the “vast major-
ity of cases the president act[ed] merely as a rubber stamp at the end of a
long and complex process.”417 The exercise of the pardon power was thus
best thought of as “the last step of a highly bureaucratized and routinized
process.”418
Jeffrey Crouch’s 2008 Presidential Studies Quarterly article on presi-
dential “misuse” of the pardon power419 was somewhat of a prelude to an
extended discussion in his 2009 book, The Presidential Pardon Power.420
Crouch’s “main argument” was that modern presidents had “abused” the
pardon power “to protect themselves or their subordinates or to reward [po-
litical] supporters.”421 In his view, the power had become a “political
weapon” in the post-Watergate world, which was “different from what pre-
ceded it.”422 More specifically, pre-Watergate pardons had been granted “as
‘acts of mercy’ for the individuals involved, or granted in ‘the public inter-
est,’” principles from which post-Watergate pardons had “strayed.”423
Crouch’s analysis of Watergate, special counsel investigations, Iran-Contra,
FALN, Clinton’s last-minute pardons, and George W. Bush’s commutation
410. Id.
411. Id. at 439–40.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 440.
414. Erler, supra note 387, at 440–41.
415. Id. at 441–42.
416. Id. at 444, Table 3.
417. Id. at 446.
418. Id.
419. Jeffrey Crouch, Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
722 (2008).
420. JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009).
421. Id. at 4, 9.
422. Id. at 4.
423. Id. at 64–65.
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of Scooter Libby’s sentence rendered his work a suitable companion to
Humbert’s classic.
Given the basic argument, Crouch’s commentary on potential solutions
(or “reforms”) was especially important. After he noted examples of at-
tempts to “involve Congress in clemency decisions or otherwise limit” the
pardon power, Crouch argued such proposals typically threw off the “ex-
isting balance of powers and [went] against the separation-of-powers doc-
trine.”424 “Self-interested clemency decisions may indeed reveal a
weakness” in the framers’ belief that “impeachment would be an adequate
check for egregious abuses of the clemency power[,]”425 but it was not a
“fatal flaw.” Said Crouch: “[w]hen a president abuses the clemency power,
we need to decide that his actions will trigger real sanctions . . . . It is only
by punishing presidents who exploit the clemency power that we can up-
hold the rule of law, and—ultimately—preserve and defend our Constitu-
tion.”426 Crouch’s 2011 examination of George W. Bush’s pardon—and
“unpardon”—of Isaac Robert Toussie assessed the validity of the legal
claim that presidential pardons must be “delivered” and “accepted” before
they are considered valid.427 His discussion of the particulars of the case
and various arguments were punctuated by an informative discussion of the
modern clemency process.428
Crouch noted Jimmy Carter’s attorney general, Griffin Bell, passed his
“clemency tasks and overseeing responsibilities” to the deputy attorney
general.429 The end result was that the task of advising the president on
pardons was assumed by “lower-ranking” officials who were “more con-
cerned with punishment than mercy.”430 There followed a “tough on crime”
mentality (during the Reagan administration) as well as “harsher drug
sentences” and “tighter sentencing requirements.”431 Toss in a “vigilant
press corps” always in search of a “gaffe,” and the result was a “dysfunc-
tional Department of Justice” and a political environment that excelled in its
ability to “choke off” grants of federal executive clemency.432
In response, Crouch insisted the president, while “ultimately responsi-
ble—and accountable—for clemency decisions,” had a “duty to use the
424. Id. at 147–48.
425. Id. at 149.
426. CROUCH, supra note 420, at 149.
427. Jeffrey Crouch, The Toussie Pardon, “Unpardon,” and the Abdication of Responsibility
in Clemency Cases, 38 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 77, 77 (2011).
428. Id. at 92–95.
429. Id. at 93.
430. Id. at 93–94. It should be noted that a large portion of this section references the work of
Margaret Colgate Love, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney. See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of
Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP.
125, 126 (2001) (discussing the tension present in the pardon power that emerges from the duty to
balance law enforcement with mercy).
431. Crouch, supra note 427, at 94.
432. Id. at 94–95.
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clemency power vigorously.”433 Crouch also argued the “regular” use of
clemency could actually protect the president from missteps and allow the
public to develop “confidence” that clemency decisions are “fair.”434 More
interestingly, he reasoned the steady, consistent exercise of clemency would
render the public less “suspicious or cynical” when “controversial” grants
were made.435
Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Robert N. Roberts agreed that the pardon
power had “become embroiled in a much larger battle related to the ongo-
ing political polarization of American politics.”436 After consideration of
the Iran-Contra pardons and Clinton’s controversial grants, however, they
recommended the creation of an “advisory panel” as a means to address the
“strong resistance of the Department of Justice to pardons.”437 Eksterowicz
and Roberts discussed other potential reforms, but were clearly less specific
or certain as to their need. They suggested, for example, that a ban on pre-
conviction pardons would be a “least drastic option.”438 A constitutional
amendment might ban pardons during periods of presidential transition.439
Without much explanation, they also threw out the possibility of disallow-
ing pardons if the president was “directly or indirectly involved” with po-
tential recipients.440
The most recent article on the pardon power published by a political
scientist focused on the idea of “seasonal clemency.”441 Working with a
data set of individual clemency warrants from 1931 to 2009, gathered in
conjunction with a research team at the University of Chicago, P.S. Ruck-
man, Jr. found that one out of every two pardons granted over the last
thirty-nine years had been granted in the month of December.442 This skew
toward a single month was even more pronounced in recent administra-
tions,443 and was not accounted for by fourth-year surges in pardon activ-
ity.444 Additional evidence was provided to show that the skew toward
December was not so much a function of trends in pardon applications or
even decision making in the Department of Justice. It was, instead, a matter
433. Id. at 91–92.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 92.
436. Anthony J. Eksterowicz & Robert N. Roberts, The Specter of Presidential Pardons, 6
WHITE HOUSE STUD. 377, 377 (2006).




441. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Seasonal Clemency Revisited: An Empirical Analysis, 11 WHITE
HOUSE STUD. 21 (2011).
442. Id. at 29.
443. Id. at 28, Figure 2.
444. Id. at 27–29.
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of the White House sitting on pardons throughout the year, delaying their
release until December arrived.445
Echoing Crouch, Ruckman argued that pardons should be granted
more frequently, and spread more evenly throughout the term, dispelling
the popular notion that they are “gifts” (some being deserved and others
perhaps not).446 The need for pardons was exacerbated by an increasingly
federalized criminal code, the booming prison population, and the negative
impact of mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws.447
III. WHAT POLITICAL SCIENTISTS KNOW (AND DON’T KNOW)
In the pages above, I have reviewed the literature on clemency pro-
duced by political scientists. In addition, I have reviewed literature on clem-
ency written by individuals outside of the discipline but appearing in
political science journals. Now, I will provide an overview of this body of
work with an emphasis on prominent findings and conclusions.
Political scientists have generally been comfortable with the idea that
clemency powers are an integral part of our system of checks and balances
and separation of powers. To some, the use of the death penalty renders
such powers an absolute necessity.
While most have seen pardon abuses as rare exceptions, almost all
agree that specifically amending the clemency power is more desirable than
abolishing it altogether, or even instituting major changes. Some go so far
as to see a distinct duty to pardon and have been willing to define abuse of
the pardon power in such a way as to include failure to act when appropri-
ate or necessary.
The literature on clemency displays a steady, consistent concern about
news media reaction to (and potential impact of news media on) the use of
pardons. The clear anxiety is that media will rarely be as fair and accurate
as they could be,448 and, as a result, gubernatorial popularity and civic un-
derstanding and acceptance of clemency will suffer. Even worse, the quality
of justice may be threatened.
Finally, there has been a clear sense that the use of parole had (and
perhaps should have) a negative impact on the use of clemency. At the state
level, several political scientists have conducted several surveys of clem-
ency powers. Invariably, these exercises have uncovered a wide range of
445. Id. at 29.
446. Id. at 35.
447. See Ruckman, supra note 441.
448. For example, reporting that Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee “pardoned” Maurice
Clemmons, who then murdered four police officers, will always sound more provocative/interest-
ing than reporting that Huckabee merely commuted Clemmons’ 108-year prison sentence to make
him eligible for parole, and that the State Parole Board released Clemmons, not once, but twice
(after a parole violation). The Parole Board members are nameless and faceless. Huckabee, how-
ever, was a Republican presidential hopeful.
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practices. Most of the literature on clemency in the states has been sympa-
thetic to the Progressive idea of creating clemency boards to assist gover-
nors in decision making in order to reduce the possibility of “abuse,” ease
the workload of governors, to deflect criticism, and/or to generally increase
the quality of decision making. There is little sense, however, that state
procedure and practice informs federal procedure and practice (or should).
At the federal level, multivariate statistical analyses suggest the pardon
power is unilateral yet somewhat affected (if not actually limited) by subtle
signals sent by other political institutions, and that presidential decisions
typically represent the last step of a highly bureaucratized and routine
process.
Political scientists have been cognizant of a clear decline in the use of
the pardon power. Today, the typical act of federal executive clemency is a
presidential pardon, granted to an individual who has already served his/her
time (if time was required), taken care of all associated fines, and has inte-
grated back into the community as a law abiding citizen (as documented by
character affidavits and an FBI investigation). The effect of the pardon is to
simply restore the recipient’s civil rights.449 Meanwhile, at the federal level,
commutations of sentence, once quite commonplace, have become exceed-
ingly rare.
Of equal importance, political scientists have also given some attention
to increases in the number of applications for clemency, the number of
cases left pending from one fiscal year to the next, as well as increases in
the overall workload of the OPA. These interests follow quite naturally
from the discipline’s general view that the non-decisions of decision makers
can constitute a substantive category of decision making in and of itself.
Political scientists from the 1940s to present have expressed concern
that the clemency process may be too heavily influenced by federal judges
and U.S. attorneys. Most recently, they have taken the position that pardons
and commutations of sentence should be granted much more often and they
should be granted on a regular basis throughout the term. The justifications
for greater use range from concern for equilibrium in our system of checks
and balances to the over-criminalization of the law, the economic burden of
booming prison population and the harmful effects of mandatory sentencing
laws.
More recently, political scientists have recommended that presidents
should give some attention to systematic outlining of broad goals with re-
spect to the exercise of the pardon power and the creation of associated
decision-making guidelines. Put another way, the pardon power should not
be so much of an afterthought and should be taken more seriously.
There is some evidence to suggest the partisan identification of the
president has an impact on clemency policy (Democrats being more gener-
449. E.g., the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold public office, own a hunting rifle, etc.
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ous with pardons than Republicans). However, few other personal attributes
of presidents have been tested, or even discussed, in any systematic manner.
While some authors have placed the primary blame for the overall de-
cline in clemency on recent administrations, Figure 1 strongly suggests the
downward trend actually began in the early 1900s. Figure 1 also suggests, if
anything, the decline has probably continued for a variety of reasons that
have been prominent at different points in time (the advent of probation and
parole, the “law and order” campaigns of Richard Nixon, the dominance of
the “retributive justice” model, a series of Republican administrations, the
presence of former Governors in the White House, changes in Department
of Justice rules, etc.).
Bill Clinton’s last-minute pardon splurge was far from “normal,” but
the evidence shows that, throughout history, most presidents have granted
the largest number of pardons in the fourth and final year of the term. The
evidence also suggests the percentage of decisions that are positive (grants)
tends to increase throughout the term. While some attribute this to the inten-
tional exercise of discretion in a manner that avoids accountability, regular
change in administrations, learning curves, and policy prioritization might
account for such trends just as well.
Pardon activity seemed to increase in the months of May and June,
previous to the 1930s. However, one out of every two acts of clemency
granted for the last thirty-nine years has been granted in the month of De-
cember. This trend clearly remains, even if one excludes Decembers that
occur in the fourth and final year of the term.
IV. CLEMENCY WRITING AND RESEARCH: THE FUTURE
Despite the widespread attention given to (and utter fascination with)
the president and the presidency, relatively few political scientists have
brought their research and writing skills to the sub-field known in the disci-
pline as “presidential studies.” The institution itself features hurdles be-
tween researchers and rigorous scientific understanding that simply do not
exist when one redirects one’s attention to the legislative or judicial
branches.450 Of course, even fewer political scientists have focused on the
pardon power in particular—all of the recent wildly controversial pardons
notwithstanding.451
It follows that the major journals of the discipline have rarely featured
articles on the president, or the presidency.452 Moreover, as demonstrated
above, the clemency literature to date has, at least arguably, produced very
450. Freeman, supra note 4, at 26–27.
451. I would number current political scientists with a primary interest in researching and
writing on the pardon power at about two—myself and Professor Jeffrey Crouch.
452. Studies on presidential elections are, of course, abundant, but primarily focus on voting
behavior (turnout and choice).
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little in the way of systematic cumulative knowledge and—for many—is
most distinctive for its lack of methodological rigor. A large number of the
writings reviewed here are best described as legal or historical, and they
feature a considerable amount of repetition (see infra Table 1).453
A plurality of the pieces utilized the case study approach. However, as
interesting as many of those pieces are, they have uncovered little that is
generalizable—a classic potential weakness of the approach. Throw in sev-
eral more pieces that are primarily normative and a mere tip of the literature
holds its head above the level of descriptive analysis.
Perhaps parents should not let their babies grow up to write and re-
search on pardons!454
TABLE 1
Books, Monographs, and Articles Written by Political Scientists and
Articles Appearing in Political Science Journals
On the Pardon Power (State and Federal),1910–2011
Aggregate Multivariate
Normative Legal Historical Case Study Descriptive Data Statistical
Analysis Analysis Approach Approach Analysis Analysis Analysis
Lieber Barnett Scoville Griffin Lieber Humbert Whitford &
(1967) (1910) (1914) (1928) (1853) (1941) Ochs (2006)
Roosevelt Brown Colburn Stewart Jensen Pederson Erler
(1913) (1940) (1976) (1931) (1922) (1977) (2007)
Hadley Gathings Adler Stewart Stoke Ruckman
(1913) (1949) (1989) (1930) (1927) (1995)
Smithers Adamany Sarat Ewing Wilcox Ruckman
(1914) (1963) (2005) (1933) (1931) (1997)
Smith & Orman & Crouch Schichor & Scott Morris
Johnson Rudoni (2008) Ranish (1952) (1998)
(1989) (1979) (1980)
Johnson & Joyner Ruckman & Dinan Ruckman
Smith (1979) Kincaid (2003) (2011)
(1999) (1999)
Breslin & Rozell Baumgartner Sarat










453. This repetition is, likewise, present in many articles written by members of the legal
profession that appear in law reviews.
454. All due respect to Ed and Patsy Bruce.
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NOTE: Not all of the pieces reviewed here are classified and the categori-
zations employed are not thought to be entirely pure. In addition, some
works could easily fit into more than one category.
On the other hand, there are reasons to retain hope (and even have
moderately high expectations) for future political science research and writ-
ing on clemency powers. The recent publication of multivariate statistical
models of clemency policy—whatever their shortcomings—has to be a pos-
itive sign for the literature as a whole. The way has certainly been paved for
the testing of more substantive and literature-based multivariate models,
possibly even in the pages of the more prestigious journals. What is not
needed is more multivariate analysis disconnected from the literature, and
high on theory and mathematical complexity, while short on substance and
insight.
For years, research and commentary on clemency produced by politi-
cal scientists and those in the legal profession (primarily law professors) has
been something like ships sailing past each other, unknowingly, in choppy
water. In the last five to ten years, however, it has been increasingly com-
mon to see members of both professions quoted in the same articles of the
Nation’s newspapers, referencing each other’s scholarly work and findings,
and engaging in public collaborations—such as the symposium recently
held at the University of Saint Thomas School of Law.455 This is, of course,
exactly the kind of intellectual cross-pollination that the founders of politi-
cal science desired for the discipline and demanded from their students.
The graduate student who bothers to make the effort can learn quickly
enough that there has been no better time to conduct solid empirical re-
search on presidential pardons. As a result of my own effort, the effort of
Sam Morison (former pardon advisor in the OPA), and the effort of a team
at the University of Chicago (headed by the Honorable Richard A. Posner
and William Landes), researchers can, for the first time, develop—or bene-
fit from an already created—researchable data set of individual pardons
from George Washington to Barack Obama. The benefits of this break-
through in available information have been seen not only in professional
journals, but also in the pages of Congressional Quarterly,456 on The
Rachel Maddow Show,457 and in episodes of the popular PBS television
show History Detectives.458
455. Symposium, Sentence Commutations and the Executive Pardon Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 665 (2012).
456. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Presidential Pardons Chart, 59 CONGRESSIONAL Q. 408 (2001).
457. The Rachel Maddow Show: On Cancelled Pardons (MSNBC television broadcast Dec.
30, 2008).
458. History Detectives: Native–American Pardon (PBS television broadcast 2009), available
at http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/video/1192734705//; History Detectives: Prohibition
Pardon (PBS television broadcast 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/
video/2146335184//.
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Nonetheless, it would perhaps be more ideal if the Department of Jus-
tice would invest time and resources for the creation of a definitive, “offi-
cial” data set of individual pardons. George Lardner, Jr., an associate at the
Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress and former Washing-
ton Post reporter has, for example, discovered a clemency warrant issued
previous to the earliest warrant found in State Department records.459 Ag-
gregate data posted on the U.S. Pardon Attorney’s webpage are—in addi-
tion to being awkwardly arranged by fiscal year—clearly erroneous.460
When an applicant manages to bypass the normal processes to extract a
pardon from the president, no one should have to guess how often that has
happened in the past, or wonder if there are particular (knowable and
researchable) circumstances that encourage such behavior.
On a related front, it is likely that political scientists will explore the
potential benefits of litigation from 2008. Mr. Lardner submitted a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request to the OPA, requesting the identities of
individuals whose requests for pardons and commutations of sentence were
denied by George W. Bush. The Pardon Attorney declined to deliver any
such list (although one was maintained)461 so Lardner appealed the denial,
waited a while, and filed suit. His victory in federal court bodes well for
ambitious and creative researchers. If we are fortunate, we may soon be
able to enjoy the publication of Lardner’s history of presidential pardons,
which is certain to be a very fine work, and may itself generate a wave of
research.
There are also signs in the political environment that clemency will
enjoy prominence in policy debates. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Pub-
lic Law 111-220) reduced the disparity between the amount of crack co-
caine and powder cocaine needed to trigger federal criminal penalties from
a 100:1 weight ratio462 to an 18:1 weight ratio, and eliminated the five-year
mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine.
459. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Significance of the Lardner Warrant, THE PARDON POWER BLOG
(Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.pardonpower.com/2010/11/significance-of-lardner-warrant.html.
460. For example, DOJ data credit Theodore Roosevelt with 1,099 pardons, commutations,
respites and remissions of fines and forfeitures. CLEMENCY STATISTICS: THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm. On the other hand, the Annual Report of the Attor-
ney General (from 1902 to 1909), credits Roosevelt with only 1,033. 1902–1909 ATT’Y GEN.
ANN. REP. The difference is entirely accounted for by the fact that the DOJ data combine clem-
ency actions taken by Presidents McKinley (in fiscal year 1902) and Taft (in fiscal year 1909),
before and after Roosevelt came into office.
461. Citing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) as the basis for withholding the information. See
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6), 552(b)(7)(c) (2012) (listing the exemptions
cited by the Pardon Attorney for withholding a list of George W. Bush’s denied pardons).
462. If a person was convicted of felony possession of five grams of crack, he or she was
sentenced to a minimum prison term of five years, but it would take 500 grams of powdered
cocaine to get the same sentence.
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The pardon power would, of course, be the perfect tool for adjusting
sentences retroactively, especially for any president who, as a candidate,
was openly critical of the 100:1 ratio, and said things like:
If you’re convicted of a crime involving drugs, of course you
should be punished. But let’s not make the punishment for crack
cocaine that much more severe than the punishment for powder
cocaine when the real difference between the two is the color of
the skin of the people using them. Judges think that’s wrong.
Republicans think that’s wrong. Democrats think that’s wrong,
and yet it’s been approved by Republican and Democratic Presi-
dents because no one has been willing to brave the politics and
make it right. That will end when I am President.463
The conservative desire for economic austerity and the increasing rec-
ognition that a booming prison population can be an economic burden has
caused some members of “the right” to embrace clemency in a manner that
might not have been possible in the heyday of Richard Nixon’s “law and
order” campaigns.464 Today, the Right on Crime website465 offers a “con-
servative case for reform.” In doing so, it takes an interest in “treatment,”
and the “reform” of “amenable offenders” who can “return to society.” The
“soft” on criminals charge will probably always be around, but it is not
nearly so loud and ever-present.
Finally, as this review documents, political scientists have traditionally
not shied away from normative issues and debates related to the pardon
power, regardless of the broad trends in the discipline or the tastes of the
editors of the major journals. If anything, the cross-pollination of disci-
plines mentioned above will only encourage participation on these fronts in
the future. That is because the members of the legal profession and the
pages of law reviews have done an outstanding job of raising consciousness
about such things as the negative consequences of three-strikes laws,
mandatory minimum sentencing, and the use (and non-use) of clemency in
death penalty cases. It is also safe to say that, today, one generally finds
members of the legal profession among the most visible, authoritative com-
mentators calling for greater, more serious use of clemency powers (at the
state and federal level).
In sum, there is room for optimism that political science research on
the pardon power will indeed blossom into a more systematic, empirical-
463. Senator Barack Obama, Address at Howard University (2007) (transcript available at
http://www.howard.edu/newsroom/news/2007/071001RemarksofSenatorBarackObama.htm). See
also Mimi Hall, Convict Petitions Obama to Reduce Crack Penalty, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-27-clemency_N.htm (discussing the unequal
drug laws and a convict’s plea to Barack Obama to equalize the penalties).
464. See David Keene, Left and Right Agree on Criminal Justice Reforms, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2012, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/15/left-and-right-agree-
on-criminal-justice-reforms/.
465. THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR REFORM, http://www.rightoncrime.com/.
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based enterprise and the result will be growth in cumulative knowledge and
understanding, maybe even some theory building. At the same time, there is
every reason to expect political scientists will continue to mix it up with
lawyers and, to some degree journalists, in analyses of controversial indi-
vidual acts of clemency, and will take a keen interest in any attempt to
reform or amend the power, at the state or federal level.
